While I think the Skeptical Theist's position is an adequate undercutting defeater to the problem of evil, it is not sufficient to deal with a mutation of the argument from evil that atheists often raise as a defeater-defeater of the skeptical theist's response to the argument from evil:
“ What happens when a loving parent intentionally permits her child to suffer intensely for the sake of a distant good that cannot otherwise be realized? …In short, during these periods of intentionally permitted intense suffering, the child is consciously aware of the direct presence, love, and concern of the parent, and receives special assurances from that parent, if not why, the suffering (or the parent’s permission of it) is necessary for some distant good.”[5]
“ What happens when a loving parent intentionally permits her child to suffer intensely for the sake of a distant good that cannot otherwise be realized? …In short, during these periods of intentionally permitted intense suffering, the child is consciously aware of the direct presence, love, and concern of the parent, and receives special assurances from that parent, if not why, the suffering (or the parent’s permission of it) is necessary for some distant good.”[5]
According to this objection, since God has not given us any special assurances of his love, and/or hasn’t made any attempt to explain why He is permitting suffering in the world, this fact strongly disconfirms theism. Like the proverbial bump in the rug, the argument from evil resurfaces in another form that can’t be defeated in the same way again.[6]
Up until this point, the discussion has assumed a Generic Theism wherein an omni-God existed, but such a God may or may not coincide with a Specified Theism such as Islam, Judaism, or Christianity. However, while the first version of the argument from evil may explicitly involve a Generic Theism,[7] this second version is asking for God to reveal Himself in some manner which creates the need for a Specified Theism. Interestingly then, the skeptical theist position conjoined with a Specified Theism would not only be sufficient to solve the problem of evil, but these two responses mutually support and reinforce one another. More specifically, if we are not in an epistemic situation to grasp God’s morally sufficient reasons, then that creates two expectations on our parts about God: 1) That God would give us special assurance of His love in some manner, and 2) That upon receiving special assurances of God’s love for us, we wouldn’t get “the solution” to the problem of evil since we are incapable of fully grasping God’s reasons for permitting evil (at least for now).
I think that these dual expectations are better confirmed on the truth of Christian theism, over and against any other specified theism. If Jesus of Nazareth was who he claimed to be, and was resurrected from among the dead as divine vindication for his allegedly blasphemous claims,[8] then God has shown us His concern for our plight, reassured us that there is a rescue plan in operation that will be fully realized in the distant good of the beatific vision, and helped us to understand that the evil is necessary, and has something to do with sin. As Alvin Plantinga writes,
As the Christian sees things, God does not stand idly by, coolly observing the suffering of his creatures. He enters into and shares our suffering. He endures the anguish of seeing his son, the second person of the Trinity, consigned to the bitterly cruel and shameful death of the cross…He was prepared to accept this suffering in order to overcome sin, and death, and the evils that afflict our world, and to confer on us a life more glorious than we can imagine. So we don’t know why God permits evil; we do know, however, that he was prepared to suffer on our behalf, to accept suffering of which we can form no conception.[9]
I think this quote captures well the central thesis of my paper: that God has made it overwhelmingly clear that He is concerned for us just as a loving parent would do, but amidst that comfort, we don’t receive all the answers to why we suffer in this life; and this probably, because God’s morally sufficient reasons are beyond our ken to a large degree just as the skeptical theist maintains. These two points then are the links in the chain that mutually reinforce one another to provide a defeater to the problem
of evil that is uniquely Christian.
Moreover, I would speculate that this distant but direct form of assurance is better and perhaps the only way that God could comfort us like a loving parent but also in manner that would earn our trust. For example, if God were to try and directly comfort someone in the present, assuming that makes sense, it isn't at all clear that that would earn our trust that God does have a good reason for permitting the evil in the world. Imagine it, God comforts us by telling us from on high so to speak, 'Don't worry, I am really smart, and really powerful. I have done all the calculations, and I have to rape this person, or I have to allow some natural disaster.' Indeed, this kind of assurance not only doesn't earn our trust, it may even have the opposite effect of making us angry. However, in the incarnation, God took some of his own medicine at a great cost to himself from within a genuine human experience of horrendous evil which surely should earn our trust that God not only cares, but has good reason for permitting the evils in the world for if there was any other way to reassure us, it would have surely not have been as costly, horrendous, and united with our human experience as the life, death, and resurection in fact are. It would be like the parent who takes their small child to get a vaccination. The child can't understand germ theory, but the parent has earned the child's trust by past action(s); indeed, the parent may even take a shot in the arm right next to the child to communicate that the vaccination is necessary.
[5] This argument was brought up by Paul Draper in a debate he had with William Lane Craig.
[6] Some theists, like William Alston rehash the skeptical theist position to this second version of the problem of evil, but I think this response it inadequate to use a second time.
[7] It seems that any version of the argument from evil is asking for the purpose, or telos, for the evil in the world, and already assumes that God is interested, concerned, and working within human history in order to bring about outweighing goods. I think that the argument from evil implicitly assumes a Specified Theism, and such a background assumption makes it a requirement to go beyond Generic Theism.
[8] Here we see the importance of the historical case for the Resurrection to be placed alongside the skeptical theists position in order to provide a defeater to the problem of evil.
[9] Alvin Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht:D. Reidel, 1985), p. 36.
Up until this point, the discussion has assumed a Generic Theism wherein an omni-God existed, but such a God may or may not coincide with a Specified Theism such as Islam, Judaism, or Christianity. However, while the first version of the argument from evil may explicitly involve a Generic Theism,[7] this second version is asking for God to reveal Himself in some manner which creates the need for a Specified Theism. Interestingly then, the skeptical theist position conjoined with a Specified Theism would not only be sufficient to solve the problem of evil, but these two responses mutually support and reinforce one another. More specifically, if we are not in an epistemic situation to grasp God’s morally sufficient reasons, then that creates two expectations on our parts about God: 1) That God would give us special assurance of His love in some manner, and 2) That upon receiving special assurances of God’s love for us, we wouldn’t get “the solution” to the problem of evil since we are incapable of fully grasping God’s reasons for permitting evil (at least for now).
I think that these dual expectations are better confirmed on the truth of Christian theism, over and against any other specified theism. If Jesus of Nazareth was who he claimed to be, and was resurrected from among the dead as divine vindication for his allegedly blasphemous claims,[8] then God has shown us His concern for our plight, reassured us that there is a rescue plan in operation that will be fully realized in the distant good of the beatific vision, and helped us to understand that the evil is necessary, and has something to do with sin. As Alvin Plantinga writes,
As the Christian sees things, God does not stand idly by, coolly observing the suffering of his creatures. He enters into and shares our suffering. He endures the anguish of seeing his son, the second person of the Trinity, consigned to the bitterly cruel and shameful death of the cross…He was prepared to accept this suffering in order to overcome sin, and death, and the evils that afflict our world, and to confer on us a life more glorious than we can imagine. So we don’t know why God permits evil; we do know, however, that he was prepared to suffer on our behalf, to accept suffering of which we can form no conception.[9]
I think this quote captures well the central thesis of my paper: that God has made it overwhelmingly clear that He is concerned for us just as a loving parent would do, but amidst that comfort, we don’t receive all the answers to why we suffer in this life; and this probably, because God’s morally sufficient reasons are beyond our ken to a large degree just as the skeptical theist maintains. These two points then are the links in the chain that mutually reinforce one another to provide a defeater to the problem
of evil that is uniquely Christian.
Moreover, I would speculate that this distant but direct form of assurance is better and perhaps the only way that God could comfort us like a loving parent but also in manner that would earn our trust. For example, if God were to try and directly comfort someone in the present, assuming that makes sense, it isn't at all clear that that would earn our trust that God does have a good reason for permitting the evil in the world. Imagine it, God comforts us by telling us from on high so to speak, 'Don't worry, I am really smart, and really powerful. I have done all the calculations, and I have to rape this person, or I have to allow some natural disaster.' Indeed, this kind of assurance not only doesn't earn our trust, it may even have the opposite effect of making us angry. However, in the incarnation, God took some of his own medicine at a great cost to himself from within a genuine human experience of horrendous evil which surely should earn our trust that God not only cares, but has good reason for permitting the evils in the world for if there was any other way to reassure us, it would have surely not have been as costly, horrendous, and united with our human experience as the life, death, and resurection in fact are. It would be like the parent who takes their small child to get a vaccination. The child can't understand germ theory, but the parent has earned the child's trust by past action(s); indeed, the parent may even take a shot in the arm right next to the child to communicate that the vaccination is necessary.
[5] This argument was brought up by Paul Draper in a debate he had with William Lane Craig.
[6] Some theists, like William Alston rehash the skeptical theist position to this second version of the problem of evil, but I think this response it inadequate to use a second time.
[7] It seems that any version of the argument from evil is asking for the purpose, or telos, for the evil in the world, and already assumes that God is interested, concerned, and working within human history in order to bring about outweighing goods. I think that the argument from evil implicitly assumes a Specified Theism, and such a background assumption makes it a requirement to go beyond Generic Theism.
[8] Here we see the importance of the historical case for the Resurrection to be placed alongside the skeptical theists position in order to provide a defeater to the problem of evil.
[9] Alvin Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht:D. Reidel, 1985), p. 36.
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