Here is a link:
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Maitzen-Ordinary-Morality-Implies-Atheism.pdf
Consider the following argument for atheism. We start with a premise that’s plainly true given the content of TI where TI stands for:
(Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer):
(1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved,
involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit
for the sufferer.
Next comes a conditional claim similar to one endorsed by Jordan:
(2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately
produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never
have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human
suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary
human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands.
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Maitzen-Ordinary-Morality-Implies-Atheism.pdf
Consider the following argument for atheism. We start with a premise that’s plainly true given the content of TI where TI stands for:
(Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer):
(1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved,
involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit
for the sufferer.
Next comes a conditional claim similar to one endorsed by Jordan:
(2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately
produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never
have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human
suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary
human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands.
Ignoring the obvious, namely, that premise 2 is formally invalid since it combines a subjunctive antecedent with an indicative consequent, let's get straight to the heart of the matter:
"Thus, even if we could easily prevent his suffering, our allowing it is always like allowing him a vaccination known to be for his own net good. Granted, it may be that God wants us to prevent the suffering, but if we fail to prevent it David will be better off as a result."
Unlike conditional statements in the indicative mood, the truth value of a counterfactual is not a function of its constituent clauses. The counterfactual connective is symbolized “” in order to differentiate it from “→.” This means that although premise 2 is a necessary truth, since it is in the indicative mood, its constituents are not individually necessary true. In particular, the part about no matter what human beings do, it will be better for David for us to do nothing to prevent his suffering. This is where the argument goes wrong because that constituent of the indicative conditional is contingent even though the conditional as a whole is necessarily true; so then it isn't stated accurately above. Instead, what is necessarily true is that God will make all wrongs right (contrast this with atheism wherein the moral enterprise is plausibly irrational; see my post on why the moral superiority of believers post), but it isn't necessarily true that no matter what we do, including letting David suffer, that he will be better off if we let him suffer. Since this constituent is contingent, what is true instead is that if we choose to help David then he will suffer less, and also be compensated by God. So, it is up to us whether or not David suffers more than he otherwise would if we just stand by and do nothing. What is also necessarily true is that if we fail to fulfill our moral duty to help David, then God will right that wrong for David! What a wonderful hope for David that is utterly absent on atheism. So this means that ordinary morality is retained since it is up to us to reduce the suffering of David; we can make him better off if we do fulfill our moral duty to him. If that isn't moral motivation to help David, then I don't what is.
"Thus, even if we could easily prevent his suffering, our allowing it is always like allowing him a vaccination known to be for his own net good. Granted, it may be that God wants us to prevent the suffering, but if we fail to prevent it David will be better off as a result."
Unlike conditional statements in the indicative mood, the truth value of a counterfactual is not a function of its constituent clauses. The counterfactual connective is symbolized “” in order to differentiate it from “→.” This means that although premise 2 is a necessary truth, since it is in the indicative mood, its constituents are not individually necessary true. In particular, the part about no matter what human beings do, it will be better for David for us to do nothing to prevent his suffering. This is where the argument goes wrong because that constituent of the indicative conditional is contingent even though the conditional as a whole is necessarily true; so then it isn't stated accurately above. Instead, what is necessarily true is that God will make all wrongs right (contrast this with atheism wherein the moral enterprise is plausibly irrational; see my post on why the moral superiority of believers post), but it isn't necessarily true that no matter what we do, including letting David suffer, that he will be better off if we let him suffer. Since this constituent is contingent, what is true instead is that if we choose to help David then he will suffer less, and also be compensated by God. So, it is up to us whether or not David suffers more than he otherwise would if we just stand by and do nothing. What is also necessarily true is that if we fail to fulfill our moral duty to help David, then God will right that wrong for David! What a wonderful hope for David that is utterly absent on atheism. So this means that ordinary morality is retained since it is up to us to reduce the suffering of David; we can make him better off if we do fulfill our moral duty to him. If that isn't moral motivation to help David, then I don't what is.
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