The Problem of Evil
Perhaps the strongest argument for atheism is the inductive version of the problem of evil as defended by William Rowe which goes as follows:
1) No good we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting some instance(s) of intense suffering (i.e. the Holocaust);
Therefore,
2) No good at all justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting some instance(s) of intense suffering;
Therefore,
3) There is no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being.
Perhaps the strongest argument for atheism is the inductive version of the problem of evil as defended by William Rowe which goes as follows:
1) No good we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting some instance(s) of intense suffering (i.e. the Holocaust);
Therefore,
2) No good at all justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting some instance(s) of intense suffering;
Therefore,
3) There is no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being.
Since, the inference from 2 to 3 is deductive, the key inference of Rowe’s argument is the inductive inference from 1 to 2. This inference is inductive because it can’t proven with certainty, but to all appearances, it seems prima facie “quite unlikely that all the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in our world are intimately related to the occurrence of a greater good or the prevention of evils at least as bad: and even more unlikely, should they somehow all be so related, that an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have achieved at least some of those goods (or prevented some of those evils) without permitting the instances of suffering that are supposedly related to them.[1]” A great example of an evil that God (if He exists) has permitted for which there is no good we know of, and for which we cannot see as being in any way necessary to achieve some outweighing good , is the Holocaust. While there are several criticisms that a theist could put forth against this argument[2], the main criticism of Rowe’s argument has been lodged against the inductive inference from 1 to 2. Philosopher Howard-Snyder has proposed the following principle as an undercutting defeater of the inference from 1 to 2:
We cannot see an x justifies believing there is no x only if we have no good reason to be in doubt about whether we would very likely see x, if there were one.[3]
In other words, we are justified in making the inductive inference from 1 to 2 only if we have no reason to doubt that if there was a morally sufficient reason(s) for God to permit some instance of intense suffering we observe that we would quite likely see what that morally sufficient reason(s) was. However, we do have at least two reasons to doubt that if God had morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world that we would be the first to know:
1) Since God is omnibenevolent and we are not, it isn’t improbable that He would grasp goods that are good enough to outweigh evils like the Holocaust, and that such goods would also lie beyond our ken; AND
2) Since God is omniscient and we are not, it isn’t improbable that He would have the ability to grasp the necessary interconnectedness of goods from (1) to the evils He permits, and that such an ability would also lie beyond what our cognitive faculties are capable of perceiving.[4]
IN addition to these two consideration, William Alston ( a famous Christian philosopher) lists six cognitive limitation on human beings that makes it in principle impossible for us to judge whether God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world:
· (i) Lack of Data: we know very little regarding such matters as the remote past and future, the afterlife, the ultimate structure of reality etc...
· (ii) Complexity of subject matter: It is difficult for the human mind to hold together large complexes of fact.
· (iii) Difficulties with Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity: It is difficult to say what is metaphysically possible given the essential nature of things (something that is also obscure) and this difficult is amplified is we deal with total possible worlds or total systems of natural order.
· (iv) Ignorance of Possibilities: We don't know whether or not there are possibilities beyond the ones we have thought of.
· (v) Ignorance of full range of values: We are in a very poor position to know whether there exist unknown goods that would justify God in allowing apparently gratuitous evil if we don;t know the extent to which there are modes of value beyond those of which we are aware.
· (vi) Limits to our capacity to make well-considered value judgments: We face tremendous difficulties when making comparative evaluations of large complex wholes.
[1] Rowe, pg. 5
[2] Rowe, William. The Evidential Problem of Evil: One might claim (1) that none of us is in a position to be justified in believing prem. 1, (2) the conclusion doesn’t deductively follow from premise 2 because (a) it could be that the prevention of some worse evils is what justifies God in permitting intense suffering(s) or (b) it could be that in a world with free, morally responsible creatures God needs to permit the occurrence of unjustified evil (gratuitous evil), (3) God would supply an intrinsic defeater-defeater, or an overwhelming defeater (i.e. Holy Spirit).
[3] Howard-Snyder, 299 (others like Wykstra, Alston, and Plantinga have endorsed similar undercutting defeaters)
[4] William Alston lists six limitations on the human mind that makes it in principle impossible to show that it is improbable that God does not, and could not have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world (Howard-Snyder, Daniel. The Evidential Problem of Evil).
We cannot see an x justifies believing there is no x only if we have no good reason to be in doubt about whether we would very likely see x, if there were one.[3]
In other words, we are justified in making the inductive inference from 1 to 2 only if we have no reason to doubt that if there was a morally sufficient reason(s) for God to permit some instance of intense suffering we observe that we would quite likely see what that morally sufficient reason(s) was. However, we do have at least two reasons to doubt that if God had morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world that we would be the first to know:
1) Since God is omnibenevolent and we are not, it isn’t improbable that He would grasp goods that are good enough to outweigh evils like the Holocaust, and that such goods would also lie beyond our ken; AND
2) Since God is omniscient and we are not, it isn’t improbable that He would have the ability to grasp the necessary interconnectedness of goods from (1) to the evils He permits, and that such an ability would also lie beyond what our cognitive faculties are capable of perceiving.[4]
IN addition to these two consideration, William Alston ( a famous Christian philosopher) lists six cognitive limitation on human beings that makes it in principle impossible for us to judge whether God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world:
· (i) Lack of Data: we know very little regarding such matters as the remote past and future, the afterlife, the ultimate structure of reality etc...
· (ii) Complexity of subject matter: It is difficult for the human mind to hold together large complexes of fact.
· (iii) Difficulties with Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity: It is difficult to say what is metaphysically possible given the essential nature of things (something that is also obscure) and this difficult is amplified is we deal with total possible worlds or total systems of natural order.
· (iv) Ignorance of Possibilities: We don't know whether or not there are possibilities beyond the ones we have thought of.
· (v) Ignorance of full range of values: We are in a very poor position to know whether there exist unknown goods that would justify God in allowing apparently gratuitous evil if we don;t know the extent to which there are modes of value beyond those of which we are aware.
· (vi) Limits to our capacity to make well-considered value judgments: We face tremendous difficulties when making comparative evaluations of large complex wholes.
[1] Rowe, pg. 5
[2] Rowe, William. The Evidential Problem of Evil: One might claim (1) that none of us is in a position to be justified in believing prem. 1, (2) the conclusion doesn’t deductively follow from premise 2 because (a) it could be that the prevention of some worse evils is what justifies God in permitting intense suffering(s) or (b) it could be that in a world with free, morally responsible creatures God needs to permit the occurrence of unjustified evil (gratuitous evil), (3) God would supply an intrinsic defeater-defeater, or an overwhelming defeater (i.e. Holy Spirit).
[3] Howard-Snyder, 299 (others like Wykstra, Alston, and Plantinga have endorsed similar undercutting defeaters)
[4] William Alston lists six limitations on the human mind that makes it in principle impossible to show that it is improbable that God does not, and could not have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world (Howard-Snyder, Daniel. The Evidential Problem of Evil).
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