Let's assume that skeptical theism is bunk. If the problem of evil is a sound argument, then it would make it likely that a perfectly good God does not exist. How far from perfect though? Well, on the opposite extreme, we can run a parallel argument that the good in the world makes it very unlikely that a perfectly evil god exists. Thus, we can RULE OUT the existence of a certain kind of God, but it would be an entirely different practice to actually try to INFER to what moral properties a creator of our world would likely have based on the amount of evil in the world.
How could we go about deciding where along the continuum from evil to good such a creator belongs? We could weigh up the ratio of good to evil in the world, and arrive at a rough idea of just what mixture of good and evil such a being would be. So, if one thought there was more good than evil in the world, then that person would be justified in believing in a creator that was anywhere from just barely good to really good, but not perfectly good. Likewise, if one thought there was more evil than good in the world, then that person would be justified in believing in a creator that was anywhere from just barely evil to really evil, but note perfectly evil. But can't we rule out the existence of such candidate gods as well based on the good and evil in the world. If the creator is anywhere from just pretty good to really good, then He would resemble human beings; especially starting from just barely good portion of the continuum. But then, there are countless apparent pointless evils that even a just barely good human being (if they had the same degree of power it takes to create a universe at least) could and would stop. For example, we can well imagine that a just barely good human being would have prevented the Holocaust, and if this is so, it is all the more reasonable that a creator further up the continumm of goodness would have done the same. What tsunamis, hurricanes, and other natural disaster's that have killed millions, surely a just barely good creator would stop at least some such evils. So far then, I think we can rule out the existence of a perfectly good, perfectly evil, and just barely good to really good creator. What about the just barely evil to really evil creator? There are countless apparent pointless goods in the world that a just barely evil to really evil creator could and would have vanquished. For example, we can well imagine that a just barely evil creator wouldn't have given us things like candy, cinema, books, warm showers, coffee, penny jars, etc. If this is so, then it is all the more reasonable to think that a creator that is more than just barely evil to any degree would do the same, especially with respect to the more valuable kinds of apparently pointless goods in the world. But then, that means we shouldn't think that the creator of the universe is perfectly good, perfectly evil, or some mixture of good and evil. It seems to me that these considerations would still hold water even if one were to claim that we cannot reliably judge the ratio of good to evil in the world.
Perhaps it is not to surprising then, that most philosophers seem to think that if there is a creator, then such a creator is indifferent to us given the distribution of good and evil in the world. However, if there is a creator of the universe, then it seems very very unlikely that such a creator is indifferent to our existence because otherwise, it wouldn't have created us, or anything else for that matter, to begin with! Moreover, it seems incoherent to argue that a personal creator is neither good nor bad in character. Additionally, if we add the fine-tuning argument in the mix, then it becomes even more implausible to suppose that there is an indifferent creator of the universe since the fine-tuning of the universe for the necessary building blocks and environments that make the evolution of life possible is incredibly surprising if the creator is indifferent to life in the universe. It isn't impossible for this to be so, but it seems very unlikely. Thus, even if skeptical theism is bunk, we can grant the problem of evil its full force, and what follows is that the creator is indifferent to us. It would be like accepting the conclusion of the kalam argument (The universe has a cause), but offering a defeater by showing it unlikely that the universe can have a cause. We would still be left with the question of why the universe exists, but we would know that it didn't have a cause, and thus, we would know that either premise 1 (Everything that begins to exist has a cause), or premise 2 (The universe began to exist), or both were ultima facie false, even if prima facie plausible. However, if one believes there is a creator, say, on the basis of the kalam argument, then such a person has a defeater-defeater to the problem of evil independently of skeptical theism, the moral argument, and the like. We would know that the conclusion of the problem of evil is false, and thus, either premise 2 (There aren't any actual pointless evils in the world, or premise 2 (an omni-god would prevent pointless evil), or both are ultima facie false, even if both seem prima facie plausible. But, we wouldn't know what the moral properties of the creator would be (i.e. perfectly good, perfectly evil, etc.) apart from some independent argument establishing the moral properties of the creator.
In conclusion, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, the fine-tuning argument, cognitive psychology (see my post We are hard-wired with an overriding defeater), certain facts about animal and infant self-awareness (see defeating Draper's argument from evil), and the case for the resurrection, and on the basis of an analysis of what follows from the problem of evil, we have a defeater-defeater of the problem of evil that is independent of skeptical theism, and so, skirts all the worries that have arisen in the literature more recently about skeptical theism.
Perhaps it is not to surprising then, that most philosophers seem to think that if there is a creator, then such a creator is indifferent to us given the distribution of good and evil in the world. However, if there is a creator of the universe, then it seems very very unlikely that such a creator is indifferent to our existence because otherwise, it wouldn't have created us, or anything else for that matter, to begin with! Moreover, it seems incoherent to argue that a personal creator is neither good nor bad in character. Additionally, if we add the fine-tuning argument in the mix, then it becomes even more implausible to suppose that there is an indifferent creator of the universe since the fine-tuning of the universe for the necessary building blocks and environments that make the evolution of life possible is incredibly surprising if the creator is indifferent to life in the universe. It isn't impossible for this to be so, but it seems very unlikely. Thus, even if skeptical theism is bunk, we can grant the problem of evil its full force, and what follows is that the creator is indifferent to us. It would be like accepting the conclusion of the kalam argument (The universe has a cause), but offering a defeater by showing it unlikely that the universe can have a cause. We would still be left with the question of why the universe exists, but we would know that it didn't have a cause, and thus, we would know that either premise 1 (Everything that begins to exist has a cause), or premise 2 (The universe began to exist), or both were ultima facie false, even if prima facie plausible. However, if one believes there is a creator, say, on the basis of the kalam argument, then such a person has a defeater-defeater to the problem of evil independently of skeptical theism, the moral argument, and the like. We would know that the conclusion of the problem of evil is false, and thus, either premise 2 (There aren't any actual pointless evils in the world, or premise 2 (an omni-god would prevent pointless evil), or both are ultima facie false, even if both seem prima facie plausible. But, we wouldn't know what the moral properties of the creator would be (i.e. perfectly good, perfectly evil, etc.) apart from some independent argument establishing the moral properties of the creator.
In conclusion, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, the fine-tuning argument, cognitive psychology (see my post We are hard-wired with an overriding defeater), certain facts about animal and infant self-awareness (see defeating Draper's argument from evil), and the case for the resurrection, and on the basis of an analysis of what follows from the problem of evil, we have a defeater-defeater of the problem of evil that is independent of skeptical theism, and so, skirts all the worries that have arisen in the literature more recently about skeptical theism.
RSS Feed
