Let's assume that (as Craig maintains):
a) Time begins to exist, at t=0.
b) The concept of timelessness is coherent.
c) The world contains a state of affairs S at which God exists timelessly.
d) God exists at t=0.
e) An A-Theory of time is true.
Under those assumptions, at S, it's not the case that time exists, so it's not the case that God knows that time exists. At t=0, God knows that time exists. Thus, there is a change in God, from S to t=0. Let E(0) be the event "God changes from a state at which he does not know time exists, to a state at which he knows time exists". Then, E(0) is an event that ends at t=0. Let e>0 be the duration of E(0). Then then either there is an interval of time [-e,0], or at least a nonempty open interval (-e,0]. Either way, time exists before t=0, contradicting the assumption that time begins to exist at t=0.
a) Time begins to exist, at t=0.
b) The concept of timelessness is coherent.
c) The world contains a state of affairs S at which God exists timelessly.
d) God exists at t=0.
e) An A-Theory of time is true.
Under those assumptions, at S, it's not the case that time exists, so it's not the case that God knows that time exists. At t=0, God knows that time exists. Thus, there is a change in God, from S to t=0. Let E(0) be the event "God changes from a state at which he does not know time exists, to a state at which he knows time exists". Then, E(0) is an event that ends at t=0. Let e>0 be the duration of E(0). Then then either there is an interval of time [-e,0], or at least a nonempty open interval (-e,0]. Either way, time exists before t=0, contradicting the assumption that time begins to exist at t=0.

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