I have long been puzzled about Craig's insistence that the Kalam can only be defended if an A-theory of time is correct. But then, all was made clear when I read his book, Time and Eternity. In his section on theological arguments for an A-theory of time relating to a robust version of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, he says (my words, not his) that on a B-theory of time, there never was, and indeed, there cannot be a state of affairs of God existing alone without the universe. Did you catch that? Craig equates a B-theory of time with a past eternal universe. That is, any scientific model of the universe that postulated an absolute origin of time, space, matter, and energy would in fact have to kowtow to the metaphysical implications of a B-theory. Why is this wrong? Even though all events are equally real and static (future eternal) in the universe on a B-theory, that doesn’t necessitate the claim that the entire ‘block’ did not have an absolute beginning of time. This sounds kinda crazy actually because it would mean that something like the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem could be overturned by a B-theory of time?! So, there could be a state of affairs with God existing alone without the universe, and then 'boom,' God creates physical time (whether the nature of that time is captured correctly by an A or B theory). So, all we have to do then is translate the language of tensed talk that Craig employs into the language of tenseless talk:
1) Every event has either an indeterministic or deterministic cause.
-Most people who say QM implies some events are uncaused mean there are events that have no deterministic cause; but if some believe that “indeterministic cause” is an oxymoron, then they really mean it just poofs into existence. However, when you press them on this last point, they usually are willing to say that the ‘poofing’ must obey certain rules involving the probability of what poofs when.--Brad Dowden (editor of IEP).
-All of Craig's 3 points he usually makes to defend the first premise of the kalam can be used here as well.
2) The universe began to exist.
-There is strong scientific evidence that the universe had an absolute beginning.
-I don't see that the B-theory of time has any implication, one way or the other, about whether the universe is past eternal (John Earman).
-I am not sure if Craig's philosophical arguments against the metaphysical possibility of a past eternal universe can be used here as well.
3) The beginning of the universe was an event.
-One response to Grünbaum's objection is to opt for broader notions of “event” and “cause.” We might broaden the notion of “event” by removing the requirement that it must be relational, taking place in a space-time context. In the Big Bang the space-time universe commences and then continues to exist in time measurable subsequent to the initiating singularity (Silk 2001, 456). Thus, one might consider the Big Bang as either the event of the commencing of the universe or else a state in which “any two points in the observable universe were arbitrarily close together” (Silk 2001, 63). As such, one might inquire why there was this initial state of the universe in the finite past. Likewise, one need not require that causation embody the Humean condition of temporal priority, but may treat causation conditionally, or perhaps even, as traditionally, a relation of production. Any causal statement about the universe would have to be expressed atemporally, but for the theist this presents no problem provided that God is conceived atemporally and sense can be made of atemporal causation.
Furthermore, suppose that the Big Bang singularity is not an event. Then, by this same reasoning that events only arise from other events, subsequent so-called events cannot be the effect of that singularity. If they were, they would not be events either. This result that there are no events is absurd.
-See the following article by Craig: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/a-response-to-grunbaum-on-creation-and-big-bang-cosmology
-See the following article on instantaneous change: http://www.davidsoderberg.co.uk/
4) The universe has either an indeterministic or deterministic cause.
5) The universe does not have a deterministic cause.
-Given that the universe began to exist, I don't see how it could have a deterministic cause in the sense of being causally determined. "Causal determinism (hereafter, simply “determinism”) is the thesis that the course of the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature." Kevin Timpe IEP
6) Therefore, the universe has an indeterministic cause.
-All of Craig's reflections on what it means to be the cause of the universe can be used here.
1) Every event has either an indeterministic or deterministic cause.
-Most people who say QM implies some events are uncaused mean there are events that have no deterministic cause; but if some believe that “indeterministic cause” is an oxymoron, then they really mean it just poofs into existence. However, when you press them on this last point, they usually are willing to say that the ‘poofing’ must obey certain rules involving the probability of what poofs when.--Brad Dowden (editor of IEP).
-All of Craig's 3 points he usually makes to defend the first premise of the kalam can be used here as well.
2) The universe began to exist.
-There is strong scientific evidence that the universe had an absolute beginning.
-I don't see that the B-theory of time has any implication, one way or the other, about whether the universe is past eternal (John Earman).
-I am not sure if Craig's philosophical arguments against the metaphysical possibility of a past eternal universe can be used here as well.
3) The beginning of the universe was an event.
-One response to Grünbaum's objection is to opt for broader notions of “event” and “cause.” We might broaden the notion of “event” by removing the requirement that it must be relational, taking place in a space-time context. In the Big Bang the space-time universe commences and then continues to exist in time measurable subsequent to the initiating singularity (Silk 2001, 456). Thus, one might consider the Big Bang as either the event of the commencing of the universe or else a state in which “any two points in the observable universe were arbitrarily close together” (Silk 2001, 63). As such, one might inquire why there was this initial state of the universe in the finite past. Likewise, one need not require that causation embody the Humean condition of temporal priority, but may treat causation conditionally, or perhaps even, as traditionally, a relation of production. Any causal statement about the universe would have to be expressed atemporally, but for the theist this presents no problem provided that God is conceived atemporally and sense can be made of atemporal causation.
Furthermore, suppose that the Big Bang singularity is not an event. Then, by this same reasoning that events only arise from other events, subsequent so-called events cannot be the effect of that singularity. If they were, they would not be events either. This result that there are no events is absurd.
-See the following article by Craig: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/a-response-to-grunbaum-on-creation-and-big-bang-cosmology
-See the following article on instantaneous change: http://www.davidsoderberg.co.uk/
4) The universe has either an indeterministic or deterministic cause.
5) The universe does not have a deterministic cause.
-Given that the universe began to exist, I don't see how it could have a deterministic cause in the sense of being causally determined. "Causal determinism (hereafter, simply “determinism”) is the thesis that the course of the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature." Kevin Timpe IEP
6) Therefore, the universe has an indeterministic cause.
-All of Craig's reflections on what it means to be the cause of the universe can be used here.
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