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Optimality Condition

5/19/2015

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INTRODUCTION
          Proposed theistic explanations are constrained by a presumption of rationality.  An agent is acting rationally in pursuing a particular goal if she acts consistently with her beliefs and desires, in a way which is likely to attain the goal, and which requires the least expenditure of time and effort.  This gives us three criteria of rational action: consistency, efficacy, and efficiency.  But what does this mean when applied to God?  After all, God is no ordinary agent.  The key question becomes: What would be the most rational way in which an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect agent could bring about his intended goal?  On the assumption that God is a rational agent, we can assume whatever he wills, he would choose the best possible means of achieving it.  This is the optimality condition, and the concept of God coupled with the presumption of rationality entails it.  This is the most important constraint on a proposed theistic explanation. 

It is important to keep in mind though that optimality is always measured against some goal.  It is up to the theist to nominate just what that goal is.  Given some posited divine goal, then we should ask: Is the explanandum the best way in which this goal could be realized?  If not, then we cannot plausibly attribute it to God.  An atheist could discredit a potential theistic explanation simply by arguing that there exists a better way in which God could have achieved his goal, and thus, some explanandum cannot be attributed to God.  If a proposed theistic explanation cannot meet the standard of optimality, it has no explanatory force at all.


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Informativeness

5/15/2015

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INTRODUCTION

Greg Dawes gives a detailed discussion of why he thinks theistic explanations are not informative.  I have taken the snippets of all the arguments, and counter-arguments he considers so that we will have a detailed understanding of his overall case before I assess it:


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Ontological Economy

5/14/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Greg Dawes defends a modified version of Ockham’s Razor which he calls ontological economy.  He says,

“…my revised version of Ockham’s razor suggests that we should not posit new kinds of entities without sufficient reason. It follows that if there is sufficient reason to do so, positing new kinds of entities is acceptable.”[1] 

[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, 136-137.


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Simplicity

5/13/2015

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INTRODUCTION
           According to Greg Dawes, a theory that can be saved from refutation only by adding one or more auxiliary hypotheses for which there are no independent reasons to believe is true, does not possess the virtue of simplicity.  Not only this, but a theory that is preserved from refutation in this manner also loses empirical content, and becomes less falsifiable. Unless such a theory exhibits a range of other virtues, it will be unworthy of our acceptance.[1]   

For example, theists often employ defenses to try to mitigate the evidential force of various facts about evil in the world.  Unlike a theodicy, a defense is merely true for all we know.  There isn’t any independent reason to think that it is likely true.  The more auxiliary hypotheses of this sort a theory exhibits, the greater will be the corresponding decrease in simplicity and empirical content.  Unless such a theory exhibits a range of other virtues, this will significantly count against it.    


[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, 133, 135.


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Past Explanatory Success

5/11/2015

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INTRODUCTION

Belonging to a research tradition that has been corroborated time and time again, and can therefore be deemed successful, is an explanatory virtue that proposed theistic explanations lack:

“…the naturalistic research programme of the modern sciences has been stunningly successful since its inception in the seventeenth century.  Again and again, it has shown that postulating the existence of a deity is not required in order to explain the phenomena.”[1]

“Some care is required here.  I am not speaking of what we might call the ‘track record’ of the same hypothesis.  For given that a hypothesis can be corroborated by known facts, considerations of past explanatory success would come under the heading of corroboration.  But hypotheses cannot be fully understood, nor should they be evaluated, in isolation for one another.  Any particular hypothesis can be seen as part of a research programme or a research tradition, which unites a series of proposed explanations sharing certain common assumptions.  And we can include under background knowledge the past successes or failures of the research programme to which our hypothesis belongs.”[2] 

Because the lack of past explanatory success is alleged to lower the prior probability of any proposed theistic explanation (if you are a Bayesian), it would be helpful to explore various relationships between facts and theistic explanations to see how they can fail and succeed to help us ultimately determine whether theistic explanations are really lacking in corroboration all things considered. 


[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion), 131.

[2] Ibid, 131.




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Testability

5/7/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Testability is usually regarded as a necessary condition for something to count as a scientific explanation.  Untestable explanations are pseudo-science at best.  In addition, a working hypothesis that can be included in the pool of live options amongst competitors should also be independently testable.  That is, it should be capable of being corroborated through a process of testing.   


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Fit With Background Knowledge

5/7/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Greg Dawes argues that theistic explanations are suspect because they are inconsistent with our background knowledge.

DEFINITION OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

“Those facts which we are aware of independently of the explanation in question…”[1]

WHY FIT WITH BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE IS A PROBLEM FOR THE THEIST

“When the mechanisms posited by potential explanation are consistent with what we already know about the world, this can (and should) contribute to our willingness to accept it.  And when they are not consistent with what we already know about the world, this gives us a reason to treat it with suspicion…And this means they are consistent not only with observable facts, but also with our best existing theories…The problem here is that the theistic hypothesis posits a mechanism—the action of a spiritual being within the material world—that is entirely unlike any other mechanism with which we are familiar. Not only does this mechanism lack analogy; it is also wholly mysterious.”[2] 

[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126.

[2] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126-127.


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