INTRODUCTION
Greg Dawes argues that theistic explanations are suspect because they are inconsistent with our background knowledge.
DEFINITION OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
“Those facts which we are aware of independently of the explanation in question…”[1]
WHY FIT WITH BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE IS A PROBLEM FOR THE THEIST
“When the mechanisms posited by potential explanation are consistent with what we already know about the world, this can (and should) contribute to our willingness to accept it. And when they are not consistent with what we already know about the world, this gives us a reason to treat it with suspicion…And this means they are consistent not only with observable facts, but also with our best existing theories…The problem here is that the theistic hypothesis posits a mechanism—the action of a spiritual being within the material world—that is entirely unlike any other mechanism with which we are familiar. Not only does this mechanism lack analogy; it is also wholly mysterious.”[2]
[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126.
[2] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126-127.
Greg Dawes argues that theistic explanations are suspect because they are inconsistent with our background knowledge.
DEFINITION OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
“Those facts which we are aware of independently of the explanation in question…”[1]
WHY FIT WITH BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE IS A PROBLEM FOR THE THEIST
“When the mechanisms posited by potential explanation are consistent with what we already know about the world, this can (and should) contribute to our willingness to accept it. And when they are not consistent with what we already know about the world, this gives us a reason to treat it with suspicion…And this means they are consistent not only with observable facts, but also with our best existing theories…The problem here is that the theistic hypothesis posits a mechanism—the action of a spiritual being within the material world—that is entirely unlike any other mechanism with which we are familiar. Not only does this mechanism lack analogy; it is also wholly mysterious.”[2]
[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126.
[2] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Kindle Ed. 126-127.
ASSESSMENT
CLARIFYING THE ARGUMENT
As Dawes rightly points out, the objection is not that theistic explanations fail to be adequate causal explanations because they say nothing about the mechanism of divine action itself. That objection leads to an infinite regress:
‘If we claim that A causes B, we must be able to specify an "intermediate causal process" that links A and B. Let's call this intermediate causal process A1. But is A1 itself a cause? Then its causal relationship to B (for example) requires a further intermediate causal mechanism, namely A2. And then A2 must be linked to A3, and so on ad infinitum. So, theistic explanations are affirming a direct, and basic causal link between A and B. A to B. And there is nothing incoherent about the idea that the divine will could be a direct cause of this type. Thus, the best objection is that because we know of no other causal process of this type, theistic explanations will lack fit with our background knowledge.’[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, 52.
Initially, it seems that everything Dawes says is correct. Indeed there are two puzzles for the theist here. First, it seems metaphysically impossible to give what you don’t have. If so, then how could God create the universe? Second, even if we can give an analogy as to how God created the universe, that doesn’t necessarily imply that the mystery of how God can act within the universe is relieved as well? I think both puzzles are easily solved.
FIRST PUZZLE
I would say that according to our best existing theories, we do know of two types of causation (or at least two analogies) that alleviate the mystery of how it is God could give what he doesn’t have, or how it is God could create the universe, and act on it:
1) Emergence is the notion that various effects and properties in the universe are ontologically distinct from their causal bases. These properties and effects are causally dependent on their bases, but the effects and properties of these bases are wholly other than their causes. For example, liquidity emerges from hydrogen and oxygen gases when combined together in the proper way, self-consciousness arises from non-conscious neurons, classical space and time emerged from a state of the universe that cannot be described in terms of classical space and time, the normative arose from the non-normative, reason arose from non-reason, logic from the non-logical, purpose from the purposeless, determinate from the indeterminate, and so on. Indeed, the fact that the universe is permeated with emergent effects and properties is many times more probable on theism than it is on naturalism precisely because this giving what you don’t have type of causality is entailed by theism, but not on naturalism.
We can say more still. In certain quantum models of the origin of the universe, space and time emerge from a state of the universe that can only be described in terms of information. Because we know that information is commonly the effect of minds, it is very surprising on naturalism that the origin of the universe can only be described in terms of information, but this is exactly what you would expect on theism. Indeed, we can just say that the information content of the origin of the universe is an emergent effect on the mind of God.
2) Theism is committed by definition to saying that God’s causal powers are determined by His essence with no more basic explanation. This would lead us to predict that all natural entities that produce effects in the natural world do so in virtue of their essences as well, so that essences are necessarily explanatorily prior to the general and singular laws of nature whether of the natural or supernatural sort. Or again, all entities that affect the natural world on theism do so in virtue of their essences on theism. According to proponents of scientific essentialism, this is exactly the kind of causation that lies at the root of physical reality. If scientific essentialism is correct, then events in the natural world are caused by the same kind of basic, and direct dispositional causal powers that theistic explanations appeal to. Not only is this fact many times more probable on theism than naturalism, it also shows that the alleged ‘magical’ causation Dawes says lacks analogy, is actually fundamental to reality. Thus, Dawes (perhaps unwittingly) is presupposing a mechanistic/passivist account of the laws of nature that is outdated by modern science!
Passivists believe that:
(a) inanimate matter is essentially passive, never intrinsically active;
(b) things behave as they are required to by the laws of nature;
(c) the dispositional properties of things (including their causal powers) are not real properties, and are never intrinsic to the things that have them;
(d) the essential properties of things never include any dipositional ones;
(e) causal relations are always logically independent events;
(f) the laws of nature are universal regularities imposed on things whose identities are independent of the laws; and
(g) the laws of nature are contingent; not necessary[1]
Passivism is a natural consequence of mechanism. Change the forces, or change the laws of nature so that new forces may come to act between things, and the same elementary things will be disposed to behave in different ways...If pressed, they would say that the powers were not really inherent in the objects that seemed to possess them, but were dependent on their ultimate constitutions, and on the laws of nature, which were universally supposed to be external to them.[2] “However, since the advent of quantum theory, mechanism is no longer tenable...”[3]
Essentialists believe that:
(a) inanimate matter it not passive, but essentially active;
(b) the actions of things depend on their causal powers and other dispositional properties;
(c) dispositional properties are genuine properties, and intrinsic to the things that have them;
(d) the essential properties of things always include dispositional properties
(e) elementary causal relations involve necessary connections between events, namely between the displays of dispositional properties and the circumstances that give rise to them;
(f) the laws of nature decribe the ways that members of natural kinds are logically required (or are necessarily disposed) to act, given their essential natures; and
(g) the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind is logically required (or is necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate.[4]
Two reasons to think scientific essentialism is true are the counterfactual regularity of the laws of nature, and that there aren’t any laws of nature in biology because such things lack an intrinsic essence.
[1] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 59.
[2] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 64.
[3] Brian Ellis, The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism, 36
[4] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 64.
SECOND PUZZLE
While we can say that the concept of emergence allows us to understand how it is that God can supernaturally accomplish the creation of the universe, and even intervene and act on the universe, it doesn’t necessarily explain how God can act within the universe in a non-interventionist mode. If we couldn’t solve this puzzle, then I think theism remains fundamentally unscathed since we have shown that God can create the universe, and perform miracles in it by acting on it via emergence. What more could a theist want? Well some theists argue that God would rarely, if ever, act supernaturally on the universe. But then the question arises, how could God act within the universe in a non-interventionist manner? There are at least two ways in which God could pull this off.
1) If the universe is one big wave function, and a certain interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then consciousness alone would be a known causal mechanism that produces physical effects in the universe. Because nobody really knows what the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics is yet, and we don’t really know if the universe is one big wave function, this argument doesn’t provide strong positive evidence for theism, but it does undercut Dawes’s claim that theism is inconsistent with our background knowledge since it is consistent with our background knowledge to think that consciousness alone can produce effects in the physical universe.
2) Another way in which certain events, states of affairs, and singular occurences in the universe could have a proximate natural causal explanation, but also an ultimately complementary theistic explanation, would be if God 'front-loaded' the universe with the right set of initial conditions that would lead to the universe unfolding in such a manner that most or all of God's goals would be accomplished without supernatural, and miraculous causal intervention.
UNDERSTATED EVIDENCE
Suppose I am wrong about my proffered solutions to the above two puzzles. There is an item of understated evidence that is so many times more probable on theism that even if we do not yet know how God can act on and within the world, that any evidence this mystery confers on naturalism would be canceled out. On theism, and Christian theism we would expect the world to be structured and disposed so that God would have almost unlimited freedom to bring about any effect in the physical world (resurrect the dead, turn water into wine, change the constants and quantities and initial conditions of the universe to bring about a transformed creation, and the like) in as many modes as possible: interventionist, non-interventionist, episodic, and continuously. On some of the most widely accepted interpretations of quantum mechanics today, this is exactly the world we live in.[1] On certain other unlikely interpretations God's actions in the world are limited to varying degrees and even metaphysically impossible (et al Alexander Bird). Why would the world be set up for unlimited divine action if nobody is around to set it up that way and use it?!
[1] Bradley Monton, God Acts in the Quantum World.
CLARIFYING THE ARGUMENT
As Dawes rightly points out, the objection is not that theistic explanations fail to be adequate causal explanations because they say nothing about the mechanism of divine action itself. That objection leads to an infinite regress:
‘If we claim that A causes B, we must be able to specify an "intermediate causal process" that links A and B. Let's call this intermediate causal process A1. But is A1 itself a cause? Then its causal relationship to B (for example) requires a further intermediate causal mechanism, namely A2. And then A2 must be linked to A3, and so on ad infinitum. So, theistic explanations are affirming a direct, and basic causal link between A and B. A to B. And there is nothing incoherent about the idea that the divine will could be a direct cause of this type. Thus, the best objection is that because we know of no other causal process of this type, theistic explanations will lack fit with our background knowledge.’[1] Greg Dawes, Theism and Explanation, 52.
Initially, it seems that everything Dawes says is correct. Indeed there are two puzzles for the theist here. First, it seems metaphysically impossible to give what you don’t have. If so, then how could God create the universe? Second, even if we can give an analogy as to how God created the universe, that doesn’t necessarily imply that the mystery of how God can act within the universe is relieved as well? I think both puzzles are easily solved.
FIRST PUZZLE
I would say that according to our best existing theories, we do know of two types of causation (or at least two analogies) that alleviate the mystery of how it is God could give what he doesn’t have, or how it is God could create the universe, and act on it:
1) Emergence is the notion that various effects and properties in the universe are ontologically distinct from their causal bases. These properties and effects are causally dependent on their bases, but the effects and properties of these bases are wholly other than their causes. For example, liquidity emerges from hydrogen and oxygen gases when combined together in the proper way, self-consciousness arises from non-conscious neurons, classical space and time emerged from a state of the universe that cannot be described in terms of classical space and time, the normative arose from the non-normative, reason arose from non-reason, logic from the non-logical, purpose from the purposeless, determinate from the indeterminate, and so on. Indeed, the fact that the universe is permeated with emergent effects and properties is many times more probable on theism than it is on naturalism precisely because this giving what you don’t have type of causality is entailed by theism, but not on naturalism.
We can say more still. In certain quantum models of the origin of the universe, space and time emerge from a state of the universe that can only be described in terms of information. Because we know that information is commonly the effect of minds, it is very surprising on naturalism that the origin of the universe can only be described in terms of information, but this is exactly what you would expect on theism. Indeed, we can just say that the information content of the origin of the universe is an emergent effect on the mind of God.
2) Theism is committed by definition to saying that God’s causal powers are determined by His essence with no more basic explanation. This would lead us to predict that all natural entities that produce effects in the natural world do so in virtue of their essences as well, so that essences are necessarily explanatorily prior to the general and singular laws of nature whether of the natural or supernatural sort. Or again, all entities that affect the natural world on theism do so in virtue of their essences on theism. According to proponents of scientific essentialism, this is exactly the kind of causation that lies at the root of physical reality. If scientific essentialism is correct, then events in the natural world are caused by the same kind of basic, and direct dispositional causal powers that theistic explanations appeal to. Not only is this fact many times more probable on theism than naturalism, it also shows that the alleged ‘magical’ causation Dawes says lacks analogy, is actually fundamental to reality. Thus, Dawes (perhaps unwittingly) is presupposing a mechanistic/passivist account of the laws of nature that is outdated by modern science!
Passivists believe that:
(a) inanimate matter is essentially passive, never intrinsically active;
(b) things behave as they are required to by the laws of nature;
(c) the dispositional properties of things (including their causal powers) are not real properties, and are never intrinsic to the things that have them;
(d) the essential properties of things never include any dipositional ones;
(e) causal relations are always logically independent events;
(f) the laws of nature are universal regularities imposed on things whose identities are independent of the laws; and
(g) the laws of nature are contingent; not necessary[1]
Passivism is a natural consequence of mechanism. Change the forces, or change the laws of nature so that new forces may come to act between things, and the same elementary things will be disposed to behave in different ways...If pressed, they would say that the powers were not really inherent in the objects that seemed to possess them, but were dependent on their ultimate constitutions, and on the laws of nature, which were universally supposed to be external to them.[2] “However, since the advent of quantum theory, mechanism is no longer tenable...”[3]
Essentialists believe that:
(a) inanimate matter it not passive, but essentially active;
(b) the actions of things depend on their causal powers and other dispositional properties;
(c) dispositional properties are genuine properties, and intrinsic to the things that have them;
(d) the essential properties of things always include dispositional properties
(e) elementary causal relations involve necessary connections between events, namely between the displays of dispositional properties and the circumstances that give rise to them;
(f) the laws of nature decribe the ways that members of natural kinds are logically required (or are necessarily disposed) to act, given their essential natures; and
(g) the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind is logically required (or is necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate.[4]
Two reasons to think scientific essentialism is true are the counterfactual regularity of the laws of nature, and that there aren’t any laws of nature in biology because such things lack an intrinsic essence.
[1] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 59.
[2] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 64.
[3] Brian Ellis, The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism, 36
[4] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature A Guide to the New Essentialism, 64.
SECOND PUZZLE
While we can say that the concept of emergence allows us to understand how it is that God can supernaturally accomplish the creation of the universe, and even intervene and act on the universe, it doesn’t necessarily explain how God can act within the universe in a non-interventionist mode. If we couldn’t solve this puzzle, then I think theism remains fundamentally unscathed since we have shown that God can create the universe, and perform miracles in it by acting on it via emergence. What more could a theist want? Well some theists argue that God would rarely, if ever, act supernaturally on the universe. But then the question arises, how could God act within the universe in a non-interventionist manner? There are at least two ways in which God could pull this off.
1) If the universe is one big wave function, and a certain interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then consciousness alone would be a known causal mechanism that produces physical effects in the universe. Because nobody really knows what the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics is yet, and we don’t really know if the universe is one big wave function, this argument doesn’t provide strong positive evidence for theism, but it does undercut Dawes’s claim that theism is inconsistent with our background knowledge since it is consistent with our background knowledge to think that consciousness alone can produce effects in the physical universe.
2) Another way in which certain events, states of affairs, and singular occurences in the universe could have a proximate natural causal explanation, but also an ultimately complementary theistic explanation, would be if God 'front-loaded' the universe with the right set of initial conditions that would lead to the universe unfolding in such a manner that most or all of God's goals would be accomplished without supernatural, and miraculous causal intervention.
UNDERSTATED EVIDENCE
Suppose I am wrong about my proffered solutions to the above two puzzles. There is an item of understated evidence that is so many times more probable on theism that even if we do not yet know how God can act on and within the world, that any evidence this mystery confers on naturalism would be canceled out. On theism, and Christian theism we would expect the world to be structured and disposed so that God would have almost unlimited freedom to bring about any effect in the physical world (resurrect the dead, turn water into wine, change the constants and quantities and initial conditions of the universe to bring about a transformed creation, and the like) in as many modes as possible: interventionist, non-interventionist, episodic, and continuously. On some of the most widely accepted interpretations of quantum mechanics today, this is exactly the world we live in.[1] On certain other unlikely interpretations God's actions in the world are limited to varying degrees and even metaphysically impossible (et al Alexander Bird). Why would the world be set up for unlimited divine action if nobody is around to set it up that way and use it?!
[1] Bradley Monton, God Acts in the Quantum World.
RSS Feed