1. If God exists, then he is omniscient.
2. If God exists, then he is free.
3. An omniscient being must know exactly what actions he will and will not do in the future.
4. If one knows that he will do an action, then it is impossible for him not to do it, and if one knows that he will not do an action, then it is impossible for him to do it.
5. Thus, whatever an omniscient being does, he must do, and whatever he does not do, he cannot do (from 3 and 4).
6. To be free requires having options open, which means having the ability to act contrary to the way one actually acts.
7. So, if one is free, then he does not have to do what he actually does, and he is able to do things that he does not actually do (from 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an omniscient being to be free (from 5 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).
Some have denied that omniscience entails knowing all about the future. They say that omniscience only entails knowing what there is to know. But the future actions of free persons are open, and not there to be known about. Thus, not even an omniscient being could know about them. This may provide a basis for rejecting premise 3 of the argument.
This sort of objection to 3 can be attacked in many different ways. One way would be to affirm that an omniscient being would indeed need to know all about the future. All propositions about the future are either true or false, and an omniscient being, by definition, must know the truth of any proposition that is in fact true. Furthermore, theists, often following the Bible on this point, commonly attribute unrestricted knowledge of the future to God.[10] Indeed, if God does not know the future actions of any free beings, then there is very little, if any, pertaining to the future about which he can be certain. For no matter what the situation may be, there is always a chance that it will be affected by such actions.
Another way to attack the given objection is to maintain that, even if God does not know about the future actions of other free agents, he must know about his own future actions. One reason for this is that God's actions are all based on perfect justice and immutable law. There is never any caprice in them. His purposes and intentions have remained steadfast from all eternity, so anyone who totally understands God's purposes and intentions, as he himself does, would be able to infallibly predict his actions. It follows that God must know what he himself will and will not do in the future, which would establish the truth of premise 3 if it is taken to refer to God.
Premise 4 is a consequence of the definition of knowledge. If a proposition is known to be true, then it must be true and cannot be false. So, if X knows that Y will do Z, then it is impossible for Y not to do Z. And this is so even where X and Y are the same person.
Premise 6 says that a free agent can do what he doesn't do. That may sound odd at first, but when it is understood correctly, it seems correct. Suppose we identify what Y does as "act Z." Then in order for Y to be free, prior to doing Z, it must have been possible for Y to do Z and it must also have been possible for Y not to do Z. If it were not possible for Y not to do Z, then Y's doing of Z could not be regarded as a free act. Free acts are avoidable. You can't be free if you had to do the thing that you did. This seems intuitively right, though some forms of compatibilism might reject it. It is not a totally settled issue in philosophy. I leave it to the reader to ascertain whether or not premise 6 is correct. If it is, then I think the argument goes through.
RESPONSE:
2. If God exists, then he is free.
3. An omniscient being must know exactly what actions he will and will not do in the future.
4. If one knows that he will do an action, then it is impossible for him not to do it, and if one knows that he will not do an action, then it is impossible for him to do it.
5. Thus, whatever an omniscient being does, he must do, and whatever he does not do, he cannot do (from 3 and 4).
6. To be free requires having options open, which means having the ability to act contrary to the way one actually acts.
7. So, if one is free, then he does not have to do what he actually does, and he is able to do things that he does not actually do (from 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an omniscient being to be free (from 5 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).
Some have denied that omniscience entails knowing all about the future. They say that omniscience only entails knowing what there is to know. But the future actions of free persons are open, and not there to be known about. Thus, not even an omniscient being could know about them. This may provide a basis for rejecting premise 3 of the argument.
This sort of objection to 3 can be attacked in many different ways. One way would be to affirm that an omniscient being would indeed need to know all about the future. All propositions about the future are either true or false, and an omniscient being, by definition, must know the truth of any proposition that is in fact true. Furthermore, theists, often following the Bible on this point, commonly attribute unrestricted knowledge of the future to God.[10] Indeed, if God does not know the future actions of any free beings, then there is very little, if any, pertaining to the future about which he can be certain. For no matter what the situation may be, there is always a chance that it will be affected by such actions.
Another way to attack the given objection is to maintain that, even if God does not know about the future actions of other free agents, he must know about his own future actions. One reason for this is that God's actions are all based on perfect justice and immutable law. There is never any caprice in them. His purposes and intentions have remained steadfast from all eternity, so anyone who totally understands God's purposes and intentions, as he himself does, would be able to infallibly predict his actions. It follows that God must know what he himself will and will not do in the future, which would establish the truth of premise 3 if it is taken to refer to God.
Premise 4 is a consequence of the definition of knowledge. If a proposition is known to be true, then it must be true and cannot be false. So, if X knows that Y will do Z, then it is impossible for Y not to do Z. And this is so even where X and Y are the same person.
Premise 6 says that a free agent can do what he doesn't do. That may sound odd at first, but when it is understood correctly, it seems correct. Suppose we identify what Y does as "act Z." Then in order for Y to be free, prior to doing Z, it must have been possible for Y to do Z and it must also have been possible for Y not to do Z. If it were not possible for Y not to do Z, then Y's doing of Z could not be regarded as a free act. Free acts are avoidable. You can't be free if you had to do the thing that you did. This seems intuitively right, though some forms of compatibilism might reject it. It is not a totally settled issue in philosophy. I leave it to the reader to ascertain whether or not premise 6 is correct. If it is, then I think the argument goes through.
RESPONSE:
Given the deductive form of Drange’s argument, the conclusion follows logically and inescapably, if all the premises are true. However, there is at least one premise that is patently false. Specifically, premise (5) is incorrect. If my counterargument is successful, then Drange’s argument from the incoherency of omniscience and freedom to the conclusion that God does not exist, is rendered logically invalid.
In this paper I will argue that premise (5) of Drange’s argument commits a logical fallacy in claiming that foreknowledge necessarily precludes free choices. Then, I will consider an objection to this argument which does not commit the same fallacy, but still claims that the future will necessarily happen based on the causal closedness of the past and God’s foreknowledge from the past determining His actions in the future. In response, I will argue that although the future can’t be changed from what it will be, it is still causally open for an agent that has free will in spite of omniscience. After that, I will consider the objection that the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and actions must be deterministic and that no other intelligible relationship can be offered. In response, I will argue that there is a plausible relationship between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom, specifically; God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to, but not logically prior to His future free acts after the creation of time so that His freedom is retained in spite of His omniscience.
Premise (5) of Drange’s deductive atheology from above can be cast as follows:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
2) God foreknows x.
3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.
The fallacy is this reasoning can be brought ought using the following example with the same structure but different content:
1) Necessarily, if Jones is a bachelor, then Jones is unmarried.
2) Jones is a bachelor.
3) Therefore, Jones is necessarily unmarried.
What actually follows from this is that Jones will be unmarried, not that he is necessarily unmarried. It is entirely possible for it to fail to be the case at some time t, that Jones will be married. Likewise, if God foreknows that he will create the universe at a certain point in the future (assuming with Drange that God is omnitemporal), then all that follows is that God will create the universe. Furthermore, there doesn’t seem to be any explicit inconsistency in a world where God refrains from creating anything at all so that the creation of the universe is not necessary and can fail to occur. Of course, if God chooses to create the universe at time t, he would be absolutely certain, on the basis of His foreknowledge, that such a creation event will occur. What is impossible is that God both foreknow that x will happen and for God to refrain from doing x. But it seems disingenuous to impose a limitation on God’s freedom based on his inability to bring about a situation in which He both foreknows x and He refrains from x for that would be a logical contradiction!
Objection:
Whereas premise (5) was interpreted as God’s foreknowledge fixing His actions in the future, there is another version. It states that since God has always foreknown what he foreknows that the future will necessarily happen. In other words, the past has already happen, and it is causally closed, so that what God has already foreknown from the past about the future is such that it will necessarily happen. This version of the argument does not commit the logical fallacy from the argument above and can be formulated as follows:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
2) Necessarily, God foreknows x.
3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.
Reply:
Premise (2) from above is problematic because it overlooks the contingency of God’s foreknowledge from above. It is the case that necessarily, whatever God foreknows is true, but it is not the case that whatever God foreknows is necessary. This was demonstrated above with respect to God choosing to create a universe or refraining from creating a universe. However, it seems that this rebuttal is insufficient because the thrust of the argument deals with a different kind of necessity; namely, the necessity of the past. Recall, the objection from above argues that the past is necessary in that once it happens, it can’t be altered. Furthermore, once we realize that God’s foreknowledge of future events occurs in the past it follows that the future is unalterable in the same way as the past. Therefore, divine foreknowledge excludes divine freedom.
In order to rebut this objection it will be helpful to explicate the difference between the concepts of change and cause. The idea of changing the past or future is impossible. This is because in order for a person to change the past or future, that person would have to bring it about that what has been, has not been, and what will be, will not be. But this is logically impossible for it would be to bring it about that an event both happen and not happen at the same time and in the same respect. On the other hand, to cause the past would be to produce an event in the past so that the effect precedes the cause. To cause the future would be to produce an event in the future where the cause precedes the event. Notice that in the case of causing the past or future the effect is not changed whereas in the case of changing the future or past the effect is changed. So then, it is apparent that the inalterability of the past and future is simply stating the definitional truth that what has been, has been, and what will be, will be. However, it does not follow from this truism that what will be, will necessarily be, and what has been, has necessarily been. Therefore, although God doesn’t have the power to change the future, He has the power to cause the future. Moreover, God causes the future freely. So then, even though no one can change the future from what it will be, a person still retains significant freedom by being able to freely cause what it will be. Of course, God’s foreknowledge will be different if he freely chooses to cause some action x from His foreknowledge of choosing to refrain from some action x, but as already stated above, it is no limitation on a beings freedom to not be able to bring about a logical contradiction.
Objection:
It may be granted that a person retains freedom of the will through the ability to cause the future but, it seems that an intelligible account of the relationship between God’s infallible foreknowledge and the contingency of events in the future has not been offered. That is, if God’s foreknowledge does not in some sense predetermine future events, then how is it that He has indubitable knowledge of their future occurrence? If this relationship is not determinate, then what is it? If no other coherent alternative is available, then it seems that the necessity of events foreknown by an omniscient being still stands.
Reply:
Indeed, if a determinate relationship exists between God’s foreknowledge and His future actions, then it would seem that what will happen, will happen necessarily. So then, I will now delineate a relationship between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom that avoids the objector’s trap.
If God foreknows that He will create the universe at time t, then this event will occur at time t. The reason why God foreknows that he will create at time t is because He will actually create at t. He does not create at t because he foreknows. Rather, God foreknows because He will create at time t. The ‘because’ in the previous sentence expresses a logical, not a causal, relationship much in the same way a conclusion is logically grounded in or derived from the premises. God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to His choosing to create at t, but His actual creating at time t is logically prior to God’s foreknowledge. Just as we can speak of temporal moments we can speak of logical moments. In other words, God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to future events, but His free choice to perform action x, at time t in the future, is the logical ground simultaneous with His foreknowledge. From this, it follows that if an event will happen, then the event is logically prior to the truth or falsity of statements (or true beliefs) about them. This same logical priority applies to God’s foreknowledge of future events. So then, the statement God will create at time t, is true or false logically prior to God’s foreknowledge; God’s creating at t is the logical ground, and God’s foreknowledge is the logical consequent; God’s creating is the reason why God foreknows that He will create. Moreover, God is free to refrain from future events such as creating at time t, so that; if He were to refrain from some future action then His foreknowledge would be different. Recall, God’s foreknowledge is necessarily true, but it is not necessary. Therefore, there is no contradiction between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom.
In conclusion, the argument against the compatibility of divine omniscience and divine freedom commits a common fallacy. From God’s foreknowledge of His free actions, one may only infer that an event will occur, not that it must occur. God is free to refrain from engaging in some action, but if He did, then His foreknowledge would be different. What is impossible is for God to both foreknow and refrain from some action, but this is not a limitation on His freedom. Furthermore, the necessity of the past is such that it is causally closed and unalterable. Likewise, the future can’t be changed from what it will be. However, this does not imply that the future is predetermined by divine foreknowledge. Rather, the future is causally open to a free agent such as God. This is so because the definitional truth that what has been has been, and what will be, will be, is not to say that necessarily, what will be, will be. God’s foreknowledge is necessarily true, but the contents of that knowledge are contingent upon His free action. Specifically, God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to His actions, but it is logically posterior to the action and determined by it.
*(This same line of argumentation can be applied to a view that says that God was timeless sans the universe, but temporal after creating the universe; God’s decision to create is logically prior to His knowledge of what world He will create, but His knowledge of what world He is going to create is simultaneous with His free decision to create sans the universe. Then at the first moment of creation God enters into time and all his future free actions are known chronologically prior to their occurrence, but His choice to do what He does is logically prior to His knowledge. This means that God doesn’t have any middle knowledge of His actions, if He did, then He wouldn’t be free)
In this paper I will argue that premise (5) of Drange’s argument commits a logical fallacy in claiming that foreknowledge necessarily precludes free choices. Then, I will consider an objection to this argument which does not commit the same fallacy, but still claims that the future will necessarily happen based on the causal closedness of the past and God’s foreknowledge from the past determining His actions in the future. In response, I will argue that although the future can’t be changed from what it will be, it is still causally open for an agent that has free will in spite of omniscience. After that, I will consider the objection that the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and actions must be deterministic and that no other intelligible relationship can be offered. In response, I will argue that there is a plausible relationship between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom, specifically; God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to, but not logically prior to His future free acts after the creation of time so that His freedom is retained in spite of His omniscience.
Premise (5) of Drange’s deductive atheology from above can be cast as follows:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
2) God foreknows x.
3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.
The fallacy is this reasoning can be brought ought using the following example with the same structure but different content:
1) Necessarily, if Jones is a bachelor, then Jones is unmarried.
2) Jones is a bachelor.
3) Therefore, Jones is necessarily unmarried.
What actually follows from this is that Jones will be unmarried, not that he is necessarily unmarried. It is entirely possible for it to fail to be the case at some time t, that Jones will be married. Likewise, if God foreknows that he will create the universe at a certain point in the future (assuming with Drange that God is omnitemporal), then all that follows is that God will create the universe. Furthermore, there doesn’t seem to be any explicit inconsistency in a world where God refrains from creating anything at all so that the creation of the universe is not necessary and can fail to occur. Of course, if God chooses to create the universe at time t, he would be absolutely certain, on the basis of His foreknowledge, that such a creation event will occur. What is impossible is that God both foreknow that x will happen and for God to refrain from doing x. But it seems disingenuous to impose a limitation on God’s freedom based on his inability to bring about a situation in which He both foreknows x and He refrains from x for that would be a logical contradiction!
Objection:
Whereas premise (5) was interpreted as God’s foreknowledge fixing His actions in the future, there is another version. It states that since God has always foreknown what he foreknows that the future will necessarily happen. In other words, the past has already happen, and it is causally closed, so that what God has already foreknown from the past about the future is such that it will necessarily happen. This version of the argument does not commit the logical fallacy from the argument above and can be formulated as follows:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
2) Necessarily, God foreknows x.
3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.
Reply:
Premise (2) from above is problematic because it overlooks the contingency of God’s foreknowledge from above. It is the case that necessarily, whatever God foreknows is true, but it is not the case that whatever God foreknows is necessary. This was demonstrated above with respect to God choosing to create a universe or refraining from creating a universe. However, it seems that this rebuttal is insufficient because the thrust of the argument deals with a different kind of necessity; namely, the necessity of the past. Recall, the objection from above argues that the past is necessary in that once it happens, it can’t be altered. Furthermore, once we realize that God’s foreknowledge of future events occurs in the past it follows that the future is unalterable in the same way as the past. Therefore, divine foreknowledge excludes divine freedom.
In order to rebut this objection it will be helpful to explicate the difference between the concepts of change and cause. The idea of changing the past or future is impossible. This is because in order for a person to change the past or future, that person would have to bring it about that what has been, has not been, and what will be, will not be. But this is logically impossible for it would be to bring it about that an event both happen and not happen at the same time and in the same respect. On the other hand, to cause the past would be to produce an event in the past so that the effect precedes the cause. To cause the future would be to produce an event in the future where the cause precedes the event. Notice that in the case of causing the past or future the effect is not changed whereas in the case of changing the future or past the effect is changed. So then, it is apparent that the inalterability of the past and future is simply stating the definitional truth that what has been, has been, and what will be, will be. However, it does not follow from this truism that what will be, will necessarily be, and what has been, has necessarily been. Therefore, although God doesn’t have the power to change the future, He has the power to cause the future. Moreover, God causes the future freely. So then, even though no one can change the future from what it will be, a person still retains significant freedom by being able to freely cause what it will be. Of course, God’s foreknowledge will be different if he freely chooses to cause some action x from His foreknowledge of choosing to refrain from some action x, but as already stated above, it is no limitation on a beings freedom to not be able to bring about a logical contradiction.
Objection:
It may be granted that a person retains freedom of the will through the ability to cause the future but, it seems that an intelligible account of the relationship between God’s infallible foreknowledge and the contingency of events in the future has not been offered. That is, if God’s foreknowledge does not in some sense predetermine future events, then how is it that He has indubitable knowledge of their future occurrence? If this relationship is not determinate, then what is it? If no other coherent alternative is available, then it seems that the necessity of events foreknown by an omniscient being still stands.
Reply:
Indeed, if a determinate relationship exists between God’s foreknowledge and His future actions, then it would seem that what will happen, will happen necessarily. So then, I will now delineate a relationship between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom that avoids the objector’s trap.
If God foreknows that He will create the universe at time t, then this event will occur at time t. The reason why God foreknows that he will create at time t is because He will actually create at t. He does not create at t because he foreknows. Rather, God foreknows because He will create at time t. The ‘because’ in the previous sentence expresses a logical, not a causal, relationship much in the same way a conclusion is logically grounded in or derived from the premises. God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to His choosing to create at t, but His actual creating at time t is logically prior to God’s foreknowledge. Just as we can speak of temporal moments we can speak of logical moments. In other words, God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to future events, but His free choice to perform action x, at time t in the future, is the logical ground simultaneous with His foreknowledge. From this, it follows that if an event will happen, then the event is logically prior to the truth or falsity of statements (or true beliefs) about them. This same logical priority applies to God’s foreknowledge of future events. So then, the statement God will create at time t, is true or false logically prior to God’s foreknowledge; God’s creating at t is the logical ground, and God’s foreknowledge is the logical consequent; God’s creating is the reason why God foreknows that He will create. Moreover, God is free to refrain from future events such as creating at time t, so that; if He were to refrain from some future action then His foreknowledge would be different. Recall, God’s foreknowledge is necessarily true, but it is not necessary. Therefore, there is no contradiction between divine foreknowledge and divine freedom.
In conclusion, the argument against the compatibility of divine omniscience and divine freedom commits a common fallacy. From God’s foreknowledge of His free actions, one may only infer that an event will occur, not that it must occur. God is free to refrain from engaging in some action, but if He did, then His foreknowledge would be different. What is impossible is for God to both foreknow and refrain from some action, but this is not a limitation on His freedom. Furthermore, the necessity of the past is such that it is causally closed and unalterable. Likewise, the future can’t be changed from what it will be. However, this does not imply that the future is predetermined by divine foreknowledge. Rather, the future is causally open to a free agent such as God. This is so because the definitional truth that what has been has been, and what will be, will be, is not to say that necessarily, what will be, will be. God’s foreknowledge is necessarily true, but the contents of that knowledge are contingent upon His free action. Specifically, God’s foreknowledge is chronologically prior to His actions, but it is logically posterior to the action and determined by it.
*(This same line of argumentation can be applied to a view that says that God was timeless sans the universe, but temporal after creating the universe; God’s decision to create is logically prior to His knowledge of what world He will create, but His knowledge of what world He is going to create is simultaneous with His free decision to create sans the universe. Then at the first moment of creation God enters into time and all his future free actions are known chronologically prior to their occurrence, but His choice to do what He does is logically prior to His knowledge. This means that God doesn’t have any middle knowledge of His actions, if He did, then He wouldn’t be free)
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