Objection 1: According to the argument from religious confusion, or problem of religious diversity, if God or some other supernatural being had the ability and desire to ensure that human beings understood the truth about such perennial matters, we would expect that being to reveal those truths widely and unequivocally. However, the existence of far-reaching religious confusion betrays the absence of any such revelation. Consequently, the existence of any such revelatory being--including God--is highly unlikely. (Note the related argument from reasonable nonbelief and similar argument from divine hiddenness.) When the focus of such an argument is widespread confusion about morality, it is occasionally called an argument from ethical confusion
| disagtheism.docx |
| derreu.1.pdf |
Response : First, how does the fact that others falsely claim to have a veridical experience of God undermine my experience of God? Suppose there really is a Holy Spirit, is it surprising that other people in the world claim to have spurious experiences of God? Logically, that does nothing to undermine a veridical experience of God unless one adopts an Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement. But we know that the Equal Weight View is self-referentially incoherent. For there are those who disagree with the Equal Weight View in which case a proponent of the Equal Weight couldn't rationally hold there view anymore since .5x.5=.25 Moreover, the Equal Weight view presupposes that the mere belief held by an epistemic peer can constitute higher-order evidence in addition to evidence qua evidence. But, this confuses psychological confidence with evidential justification. Surely, when we meet others who hold our beliefs that can boost our psychological confidence, but it does nothing to make an argument stronger in and of itself.
The best way to spin this objection is as follows: The presence of false claims to the Holy Spirit ought to undermine my confidence in the reliability of my cognitive faculties since so many others apparently have gone wrong despite their sincerity.
Response: The Christian doesn't have to say that all religious experience is completely spurious. It may well be that adherents of other religions due have veridical experiences of god to a certain measure (the ground of all being, the moral absolute, the loving father of mankind). Also, this objection assumes that Christian religious experience is exactly the same as all other religious experience, but this is clearly false. For example, the Buddhist feels like they lose their identity and melt into the all encompassing oneness of reality. Why think that a Muslim, or Mormon experience of God is indistinguishable from a Christian? Go ahead and test it by asking people who convert from Islam to Christianity. I hazard to say that the phenomenoloigical experience reported in the vast majority of these cases will turn out to be unique and distinct from other kinds of religious experiences.
Moreover, this objection construes the mechanism of belief in Christianity as some sort of innate brain module and while Plantinga adopts this model, William Lane Craig doesn't. Craig thinks that it is to problematic to think of our belief in Christian theism arising from some sort of innate cognitive mechanism. He prefers to model our belief in Christian theism on the basis of the witness of the Holy Spirit (in a properly basic manner). If we adopt this model, then our warrant for Christian theism is external to us, and any worries over an innate and evolved cognitive mechanism vanishes.
Third, if Jesus was resurrected from the dead as a vindication of his allegedly blasphemous claims to be the personal embodiment of YHWH, then it is false that God hasn't revealed himself uniquely and clearly in human history. Here I think, John Hick is helpful,
"... If Jesus was literally God incarnate, and if it is by his death alone that men can be saved, and by their response to him alone that they can appropriate that salvation, then the only doorway to eternal life is Christian faith..."
John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 179-80.
If Jesus was indeed God incarnate, Christianity is the only religion founded by God in person, and must as such be uniquely superior to all other religions and insofar as the texts contained within the Bible are our best sources for establishing this, we can see that the inspiration of the Bible has everything to do with the Christ-event and only secondarily to do with the human witness to this event with all its human properties. The Christ-event gives us as it were a structure for our ignorance for determining the EXTENT of inspiration and apart from which we would not know of the FACT of inspiration. The only step left now is to make a case that Jesus was God incarnate which I think the work of William Lane Craig, N.T. Wright, and others establishes via a case for the resurrection in conjunction with laying out reasons to think Jesus had a radical divine and messianic self-understanding (See my section: Biblical Studies/A Case For the Resurrection).
This can be also be known in a properly basic manner. Moreover, there isn't really an importance, or even a method of testing other religions because they don't claim to be based on historical and contingent events in space-time that were proven with a miracle that can be tested such as in the case of Christianity and the resurrection. So, something that needs to be added for this argument to be a good one is that it would be surprising on theism if God revealed himself decisively in history and if there are other competing revelations around that He wouldn't leave us a way to know which among the competing revelations is true. Once we bring out this implicit premise, it becomes clear I think that this argument isn't a good one any longer because it presumes that God hasn't left us any way to decide between the competing religiosn which is true, which means that it presumes that the evidence for the resurrection is poor, and moreover, it presumes that God hasn't provided a non-evidential source of justification for knowing which revelation is true. All of these presumptions are plausibly false I think. And in fact, as has already been stated, most other religions aren't even in the same league as Christianity as claiming to be true in a testable sense and by the arguments own criteria it should discount those religions as really being from God. Moreover, I think we can see that a false assumption of this objection is: If god did reveal himself clearly in human history, then there wouldn't be a variety of religions in the world, but even Schellenberg denies this has to be the case in his book: Human Reason and Divine Hiddenness (182) he seeks to answer the following question:
"...If a strong epistemic situation in relation to theism were to obtain, [would] human religiousness would be reduced to a narrow and stifling uniformity? ...what is likely to follow from God presenting himself to the experience of all individuals capable of recognizing him in the manner desribed in Chapter 2 is not a uniform pattern of religiousness, but rather patterns of religious life that are (at one level at least) compatible, united under a common acceptance of God as personal and loving. Even this may be saying to much. For if humans would remian free to reject god, as I have argued they would, there would presumably remain the possibility of religious beliefs and practices incompatible at all levels with traditions built up on the experience of god, resulting directly or indirectly from the rejection of that experience by some individual(s) at some point in time."
The objector might persist and say, but still, even supposing there really is a Holy Spirit, is it surprising that other people in the world claim to have spurious experiences of God? There is mounting evidence that we are naturally disposed to form belief in an omni-God as a result of our biology --Natural Born Believers
(Experimental evidence, including cross-cultural studies, suggests that three-year-olds attribute super, god-like qualities to lots of different beings. Super-power, super-knowledge and super-perception seem to be default assumptions. Children then have to learn that mother is fallible, and dad is not all powerful, and that people will die. So children may be particularly receptive to the idea of a super creator-god. It fits their predilections.)
Even if these data from cog. sci. aren't very theistic (and I don't think they are nearly as theistic as Barrett paints them out to be, then we have a very natural and plausible explanation for why there are such a diversity of religions, "Specifically, the way ordinary human minds develop in the first five years of life, under ordinary developmental and cultural conditions, bias children to believe in spirits, hosts, angels, devils, and gods." Thus, it isn't surprising where these religions come from, but what is surprising is that there is one that is testable.
One more comment that I think is worthwhile here is that what is presupposed in both of these objections is that
people at all times and places are just waiting to sincerely believe in God and love Him, and worship Him if only God would give them enough evidence (i.e. by appearing). However, I think there is very strong evidence from evolutionary psychology that strongly implies that we are very self-centered creatures that would prefer to create our own rules and life principles just as much, or more, than we would prefer to be God-centered and follow his wisdom for the good life (I take it that this is what original sin amounts to, or at least approximates to). Thus, to claim that human beings are just passive divine receptacles of truth (and therefore inculpable) is to have a view of human nature that is mistaken. Since God judges people on the basis of the revelation they do have, it is actually for a persons own good that they do not get to hear the Gospel (much less receive convincing evidence of its truth) if and until they are open to such a revelation. Were they to both hear the Gospel and receive convincing evidence of its truth before they are ready for it, then in such a case they will be judged more harshly since a person is fairly jduged on the basis of the information they have available to them. Thus, everybody who would freely believe in the Gospel is born at a time and place in which they do get to hear it, and those who do not are restricted such a revelation for their own good! Thus, this argument is actually wishing more judgment on people then they deserve making this argument not only intellectually untenable but also morally revulting.
The best way to spin this objection is as follows: The presence of false claims to the Holy Spirit ought to undermine my confidence in the reliability of my cognitive faculties since so many others apparently have gone wrong despite their sincerity.
Response: The Christian doesn't have to say that all religious experience is completely spurious. It may well be that adherents of other religions due have veridical experiences of god to a certain measure (the ground of all being, the moral absolute, the loving father of mankind). Also, this objection assumes that Christian religious experience is exactly the same as all other religious experience, but this is clearly false. For example, the Buddhist feels like they lose their identity and melt into the all encompassing oneness of reality. Why think that a Muslim, or Mormon experience of God is indistinguishable from a Christian? Go ahead and test it by asking people who convert from Islam to Christianity. I hazard to say that the phenomenoloigical experience reported in the vast majority of these cases will turn out to be unique and distinct from other kinds of religious experiences.
Moreover, this objection construes the mechanism of belief in Christianity as some sort of innate brain module and while Plantinga adopts this model, William Lane Craig doesn't. Craig thinks that it is to problematic to think of our belief in Christian theism arising from some sort of innate cognitive mechanism. He prefers to model our belief in Christian theism on the basis of the witness of the Holy Spirit (in a properly basic manner). If we adopt this model, then our warrant for Christian theism is external to us, and any worries over an innate and evolved cognitive mechanism vanishes.
Third, if Jesus was resurrected from the dead as a vindication of his allegedly blasphemous claims to be the personal embodiment of YHWH, then it is false that God hasn't revealed himself uniquely and clearly in human history. Here I think, John Hick is helpful,
"... If Jesus was literally God incarnate, and if it is by his death alone that men can be saved, and by their response to him alone that they can appropriate that salvation, then the only doorway to eternal life is Christian faith..."
John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 179-80.
If Jesus was indeed God incarnate, Christianity is the only religion founded by God in person, and must as such be uniquely superior to all other religions and insofar as the texts contained within the Bible are our best sources for establishing this, we can see that the inspiration of the Bible has everything to do with the Christ-event and only secondarily to do with the human witness to this event with all its human properties. The Christ-event gives us as it were a structure for our ignorance for determining the EXTENT of inspiration and apart from which we would not know of the FACT of inspiration. The only step left now is to make a case that Jesus was God incarnate which I think the work of William Lane Craig, N.T. Wright, and others establishes via a case for the resurrection in conjunction with laying out reasons to think Jesus had a radical divine and messianic self-understanding (See my section: Biblical Studies/A Case For the Resurrection).
This can be also be known in a properly basic manner. Moreover, there isn't really an importance, or even a method of testing other religions because they don't claim to be based on historical and contingent events in space-time that were proven with a miracle that can be tested such as in the case of Christianity and the resurrection. So, something that needs to be added for this argument to be a good one is that it would be surprising on theism if God revealed himself decisively in history and if there are other competing revelations around that He wouldn't leave us a way to know which among the competing revelations is true. Once we bring out this implicit premise, it becomes clear I think that this argument isn't a good one any longer because it presumes that God hasn't left us any way to decide between the competing religiosn which is true, which means that it presumes that the evidence for the resurrection is poor, and moreover, it presumes that God hasn't provided a non-evidential source of justification for knowing which revelation is true. All of these presumptions are plausibly false I think. And in fact, as has already been stated, most other religions aren't even in the same league as Christianity as claiming to be true in a testable sense and by the arguments own criteria it should discount those religions as really being from God. Moreover, I think we can see that a false assumption of this objection is: If god did reveal himself clearly in human history, then there wouldn't be a variety of religions in the world, but even Schellenberg denies this has to be the case in his book: Human Reason and Divine Hiddenness (182) he seeks to answer the following question:
"...If a strong epistemic situation in relation to theism were to obtain, [would] human religiousness would be reduced to a narrow and stifling uniformity? ...what is likely to follow from God presenting himself to the experience of all individuals capable of recognizing him in the manner desribed in Chapter 2 is not a uniform pattern of religiousness, but rather patterns of religious life that are (at one level at least) compatible, united under a common acceptance of God as personal and loving. Even this may be saying to much. For if humans would remian free to reject god, as I have argued they would, there would presumably remain the possibility of religious beliefs and practices incompatible at all levels with traditions built up on the experience of god, resulting directly or indirectly from the rejection of that experience by some individual(s) at some point in time."
The objector might persist and say, but still, even supposing there really is a Holy Spirit, is it surprising that other people in the world claim to have spurious experiences of God? There is mounting evidence that we are naturally disposed to form belief in an omni-God as a result of our biology --Natural Born Believers
(Experimental evidence, including cross-cultural studies, suggests that three-year-olds attribute super, god-like qualities to lots of different beings. Super-power, super-knowledge and super-perception seem to be default assumptions. Children then have to learn that mother is fallible, and dad is not all powerful, and that people will die. So children may be particularly receptive to the idea of a super creator-god. It fits their predilections.)
Even if these data from cog. sci. aren't very theistic (and I don't think they are nearly as theistic as Barrett paints them out to be, then we have a very natural and plausible explanation for why there are such a diversity of religions, "Specifically, the way ordinary human minds develop in the first five years of life, under ordinary developmental and cultural conditions, bias children to believe in spirits, hosts, angels, devils, and gods." Thus, it isn't surprising where these religions come from, but what is surprising is that there is one that is testable.
One more comment that I think is worthwhile here is that what is presupposed in both of these objections is that
people at all times and places are just waiting to sincerely believe in God and love Him, and worship Him if only God would give them enough evidence (i.e. by appearing). However, I think there is very strong evidence from evolutionary psychology that strongly implies that we are very self-centered creatures that would prefer to create our own rules and life principles just as much, or more, than we would prefer to be God-centered and follow his wisdom for the good life (I take it that this is what original sin amounts to, or at least approximates to). Thus, to claim that human beings are just passive divine receptacles of truth (and therefore inculpable) is to have a view of human nature that is mistaken. Since God judges people on the basis of the revelation they do have, it is actually for a persons own good that they do not get to hear the Gospel (much less receive convincing evidence of its truth) if and until they are open to such a revelation. Were they to both hear the Gospel and receive convincing evidence of its truth before they are ready for it, then in such a case they will be judged more harshly since a person is fairly jduged on the basis of the information they have available to them. Thus, everybody who would freely believe in the Gospel is born at a time and place in which they do get to hear it, and those who do not are restricted such a revelation for their own good! Thus, this argument is actually wishing more judgment on people then they deserve making this argument not only intellectually untenable but also morally revulting.
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