William Lane Craig writes: The sort of religious experiences which have been artificially induced by brain stimulus have been more akin to pantheistic religious experiences, a sense of oneness with the All, rather than Christian experience of God's personal presence and love. But more importantly, the fact that a non-veridical experience can be induced which is qualitatively identical to a veridical experience does absolutely nothing to undermine the fact that there are veridical experiences and that we are rational in taking our experiences to be veridical. Otherwise, one would have to say that because neuroscientists can artificially cause us to see and hear things that aren't really there, our senses of sight and hearing are unreliable or untrustworthy! Just because a neurologist could stimulate my brain to make me think that I'm having an experience of God is no proof at all that on some occasion when he is not stimulating my brain that I do not have a genuine experience of God.
Secondly, this objection construes the mechanism of belief in Christianity as some sort of innate brain module and while Plantinga adopts this model, William Lane Craig doesn't. Craig thinks that it is to problematic to think of our belief in Christian theism arising from some sort of innate cognitive mechanism. He prefers to model our belief in Christian theism on the basis of the witness of the Holy Spirit (in a properly basic manner). If we adopt this model, then our warrant for Christian theism is external to us, and any worries over an innate and evolved cognitive mechanism vanishes.
Third, even if this argument showed us that religious belief was unwarranted apart from arguments and evidence, this wouldn't mean that there aren't good enough arguments and evidence to warrant some particular religious belief such as Christianity.
Secondly, this objection construes the mechanism of belief in Christianity as some sort of innate brain module and while Plantinga adopts this model, William Lane Craig doesn't. Craig thinks that it is to problematic to think of our belief in Christian theism arising from some sort of innate cognitive mechanism. He prefers to model our belief in Christian theism on the basis of the witness of the Holy Spirit (in a properly basic manner). If we adopt this model, then our warrant for Christian theism is external to us, and any worries over an innate and evolved cognitive mechanism vanishes.
Third, even if this argument showed us that religious belief was unwarranted apart from arguments and evidence, this wouldn't mean that there aren't good enough arguments and evidence to warrant some particular religious belief such as Christianity.
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