I will use the following version of this argument because the version that Rachel's uses is logically invalid and has hidden assumptions that need to be brought out in order to make his argument stronger (http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/05/james-rachels-argument-from-moral-autonomy-against-the-existence-of-god.html):
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, then God is a fitting object of worship by autonomous moral agents;
(2) If worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency, then it is not the case that God is a fitting object of worship by autonomous moral agents;
(3) Worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency;
Therefore,
(4) God does not exist.
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, then God is a fitting object of worship by autonomous moral agents;
(2) If worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency, then it is not the case that God is a fitting object of worship by autonomous moral agents;
(3) Worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency;
Therefore,
(4) God does not exist.
All we have to say is that worship is either a religious ought, or a prudential ought, instead of a moral ought. That way, worship and autonomous moral agency will not conflict because Rachels equivocates in his use of 'ought':
| jospehlombardi.pdf |
Here is my version of why worship cannot be a moral ought, but is instead a prudential ought that is contingent upon humans achieving perfect virtue, or holy wills. Worship is merely an instrumental means to that end, but once that end is achieved, worship is no longer a prudential obligation for such beings:
First thing to notice is that this argument, even if sound, doesn't demonstrate that God does not exist, but rather, it would only show that the worship of God is not consistent with autonomous moral agency and thus we might choose to scrap the notion of an obligation to worship God, but this doesn't entail that the greatest conceivable being does not exist (see Reasonable Atheism: A Moral Case for Respectful Disbelief Chpt. 5). However, I do not think this argument succeeds in demonstrating this:
Premise 3 will be the focus of my critique, but I will critique that premise by way of parody on Rachels' argument. Let's use Rachels' definition of what it would mean to worship as that which has unqualified claim of authority over us (He says: “That God is not to be judged, challenged, defied, or disobeyed is at bottom a truth of logic. To do any of these things is incompatible with taking him as one to be worshiped.” (p. 8)). Moreover, let's substitute the term objective moral laws, for the the word God in his argument:
1) Necessarily, if objective moral facts exist, then objective moral facts are a fitting object for claiming unqualified obedience from autonomous moral agents;
(2) If objective moral facts require abandoning autonomous moral agency, then it is not the case that objective moral facts are a fitting object of unqualified obedience by autonomous moral agents;
(3) Giving something unqualified obedience requires abandoning autonomous moral agency;
Therefore,
(4) Objective moral facts do not exist.
This pardoy works precisely because Christians view God as being the ground of objective moral facts (it is in virtue of that fact, that God is considered to be worthy in the first place), and because most philosophers today (whether atheist or not) are moral realists who are quite comfortable with the notion of moral values and duties that are binding on all of us. But then, if Rachels' argument is sound, he would be able to disprove the existence of objective right and wrong as well! Surely there is something very wrong with one or more of his premises. Indeed, it seems that his terms are ambiguous and lend to the appearance of a good argument. So, let's clear them up for him. It does seem true that we have a duty to align our wills toward that which is objectively right, and abhor that which is objectively wrong whatever the ground of objective moral laws happens to be. Moreover, since we know that objective moral laws exist, we are not able to judge them or challenge them in the sense of changing them to match our preferences or tastes if the two happen to be in discord. So, on the order of knowing, we are logically incapable of changing an objective truth. This is true of all objective truths; what is true is true; this is a tautology. However, we may not be able to change what is true, but we can freely choose to defy and disobey any and all objective moral laws. In moral philosophy, autonomy is the ability of a rational individual to make an informed and uncoered decision for oneself to abide by or reject objective moral law.[3]Kant argued that autonomy is demonstrated by a person who decides on a course of action out of respect for moral duty. That is, an autonomous person acts morally solely for the sake of doing "good", independently of other incentives. In his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant applied this concept to create a definition of personhood. He suggested that such compliance with moral law creates the essence of human dignity. But therein lies the rub with Rachel's use of the terms worship and autonomy. Just because we have a duty to always do what is right, and thus objective moral laws have an unqualified claim of authority on us (i.e.like in his definition of worship), that doesn't mean that we are thereby coerced, or unable to make a rational and informed decision to always abide by (i.e. worship) objective moral law out of respect. In other words, Rachels' confuses making a freely chosen COMMITMENT out of RESPECT to follow some course of action with being COERCED to follow some course of action. Thus, worshipping God is the choice of autonomous moral agents who are acting autonomously in virtue of their decision to follow a course of action out of respect for moral duty (i.e. to align our wills with the source of and embodiment of the highest good, namely, God). Indeed, true autonomy isn't the freedom to do whatever you want, it is the freedom to do only the good. According to Kant, man's highest good in life is to achieve the happiness that arises out of a state of complete and mature virture. This is the moral state of God, and it is why He is the happiest, most autonomous, and most virtuous being there can be. For such a person, there is no duty generated to abide by objective moral laws because such a person always acts in accordance with what for us are duties. Only morally immature and autonomous moral agents need to fulfill duties. So, it is quite the opposite of what Mr. Rachels' suggest then; the more we make a rationally informed and uncoerced decision to integrate the duty of objective law into our characters (which is integrally bound up with worship of God), the freer, and more autonomous we become. Moreover, since God is the source of objective moral laws, we have an example of how to live as a completely virtuous and autonomous moral agent (in the incarnate Christ), and to do so, and do so to the point of complete moral maturaity would be the fulfillment of our human dignity, happiness, and freedom. But of course, we are free to choose to worship God or not, He will not coerce us, even now, even when human beings are able to take man's greatest good, and turn it into an argument that allegedly disproves the existence of that highest good; that if anything, proves that God allows us our autonomy. *Last note: I do not like his definition of worship either; a simple definition would be the complete emulation (to try to equal) and adoration (devoted love) of God; I am not sure that defining it as doing whatever God commands as Rachels does is anything but a straw man and/or equivocation of the term worship which Rachels wants to paint as meaning something like the following: the complete submission to a being that may or may not coerce us to do something wrong (as I detect from his entire argument), and I think it confuses divine voluntarism in metaethics with our general duty to align our wills with what is in accordance with the good and the right which on Christian theism is God Himself of course; it is because of this fact that we ADORE and EMULATE God, or worship Him. We all emulate moral facts, but we would not adore them unless there was a person (God) who either grounded them and/or always acted in accord with them because of moral perfection of such a person.
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