Objection: Most problems which were unexplained by science in purely naturalistic terms have now been explained by science in purely naturalistic terms. So, by direct induction, any alleged evidence against naturalism has a scientific explanation in purely naturalistic terms.
Science has made and continues to make such great progress throughout history, gradually whittling away at the set of things that were previously not scientifically understood, that whatever it is that you are presently bringing forth as evidence against naturalism, I am sure that science will eventually get to that in time and explain it, as well, as entirely the product of natural causes.
Science has made and continues to make such great progress throughout history, gradually whittling away at the set of things that were previously not scientifically understood, that whatever it is that you are presently bringing forth as evidence against naturalism, I am sure that science will eventually get to that in time and explain it, as well, as entirely the product of natural causes.
Response: Well, there is certainly something correct about this objection to theism. There have indeed been alleged supernatural phenomena in the past that have been replaced with natural explanations. However, I do not think that main thrust of this argument is any good.
First, this objection construes the conditional probability of some evidence "E" on the hypothesis "H" (there is some natural explanation of a phenomena) against our background knowledge in terms of frequency probability. So, the fact that so many alleged supernatural phenomena have been replaced by natural explanations, means that the prior probability of some alleged observation that is not currently scientifically understood has a prior probability in its favor that science can or at least will be able to explain that observations naturally. Moreover, I agree that we should always pursue natural explanations first and foremost (methodological naturalism), and I would also agree that the prior probability is very low for some alleged supernatural event when we are considering those cases where some well-established reference class is being included in our background knowledge and if that reference class also includes established laws of nature (all else being equal). For example, it seems that there are underlying laws that are sufficient to account for lighting, and so if someone were to report to us that a god caused one or more observations of lighting we would have to say that the prior probability of this is low because we have a well established reference class that can account for lighting that is natural in nature. However, if we the probability that we would have a particular instance of lighting is so low on any natural explanation, but high on some supernatural explanation, then the probability of the specific evidence in favor of a particular miracle claim can overcome any initial improbability. However, this argument is more about explaining some observation which is NOT scientifically understood whereas GOOD arguments for the existence of God will sometimes include premises that are supported by observations that science CAN explain such as: The universe began to exist, or the universe if fine-tuned. Bad arguments for theism sometimes include premises that appeal to 'mysteries' that are not part of our scientific knowledge of the world. This objection mainly concerns 'God of the Gaps' type arguments and I whole heartedly agree that this objection undercuts those kinds of arguments as well as pointing out that our ignorance of some observation isn't positive evidence for the existnece of God anyway.
Moreover, this type of reasoning; reasoning from known to the unknown, or from past instances to future instances is only informative for establishing a prior probability when we have a well established reference class. If we try to reason from the known to the unknown in all cases then we will not only rule out supernatural explanations, but also new scientific discoveries. For example, when we first made observations that would eventually lead us to infer the existence of black holes, we were unable to reason from the known to the unknown since we had no prior established reference class for what a black hole was. So, instead of frequencies, we used inference to the best explanation, and now we are very sure that black holes exist. However, on the basis of frequency probabilities, we might have had to ignore the specific evidence for black holes in the sense that the prior probability (in terms of frequencies) would have been so low that our specific evidence might not have been able to overcome it. So, frequencies are not some absolute tool that always help us in finding the best explanations for our observations. They will not only mislead us sometimes, but to say that we will one day have a natural explanation of all phenomena is to commit a naturalism of the gaps especially when a premise in a metaphysical argument for God's existence is supported on the basis of what we know to be true in science (e.g. the universe began to exist).
Why think that the prior improbability for a supernatural explanation is always low on this account? Indeed, the major arguments for the existence of God are immune to these sorts of frequency probablitites. In particular, many of the phenomena that are offered today (such as in the kalam argument), have to do with singular events that have never been repeated in the history of our universe, and for which there cannot be any frequency probabilities. What is the prior probability that the universe will have a natural cause? How many universes that have begun to exist to have been shown to have a natural cause? This probability is inscrutable since this event is singular, and has to do with the very origin of the laws of nature themselves whereas other phenomena like lighting, operate with a frequency and predictability according to the laws of nature which can be observed with some sort of frequency. Moreover, if the universe did begin to exist, and if the universe needs a cause, then the cause cannot be natural. This point applies to the fine-tuning argument as well.
Third, this sort of frequency probablity rules out the types of religions that claim that what regulary occurs in the universe is the result of immediate and divine causation. For example, in Norse mythology, there is a god of thunder that causes thunder. However, on theism, God is distinct from the universe, and has set up the universe to operate according to natural laws. So, it seems to me that this argument works quite well for finite godism, pantheism, etc. However, this objection doesn't rule out theism, or even necessarily constitute a low prior probability for theism.
Fourth, on a Leibnizian view of providence, we would expect the number of miralces that god performs in the universe to be as low as possible so that the theist can agree with the atheist that some observation which we currently don't understand will have a scientific explanation someday, but again, we have evidence for the existence of God based on actual features of our universe that science has established.
Fifth, while some design arguments may infer the existence of God based on the orderliness of nature (i.e. Swinburne) many arguments for the existence of God today are not BASED on the laws of nature, but rather have to do with things like the beginning of the universe, the fine-tuning of the constants and certain arbitary initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, the existence of moral facts, explaining certain historical facts about the death of Jesus, etc. which themselves are inferring to explanations that either have nothing to do with the laws of nature, or the laws of nature are not part of the specific evidence ,but rather are included in our background knowledge; they are metaphysical arguments instead of some sort of creation science.
Sixth, the very success of science is itself evidence for theism over naturalism. Take the recent discovery of the Higgs boson. The predictions about the existence of the Higgs was based on the mathematics of the standard model of particle physics! Think about that for a second. The universe is so permeated with a mathematical structure at its most fundamental level that we can predict the existence of things like the Higgs boson based on the mathematics of it all! OF ITSELF, this is better explained on theism since on theism the universe is created and patterned after the intentions of a rational mind such that other minds like ourselves can model the universe using mathematics whereas on naturalism, this feature of the universe is surprising since it didn't have to be that way, and since the universe is not the product of any sort of personal and rational being, it is very surprising indeed that the universe betrays a rational pattern which can be both discovered and which is intelligible to finite rational minds like ourselves. So, both the mathematical discoverability and intelligibility of features in our universe are better explained on theism compared to naturalism given the ultimate explanation of these respective worldviews for the universe we live in.
First, this objection construes the conditional probability of some evidence "E" on the hypothesis "H" (there is some natural explanation of a phenomena) against our background knowledge in terms of frequency probability. So, the fact that so many alleged supernatural phenomena have been replaced by natural explanations, means that the prior probability of some alleged observation that is not currently scientifically understood has a prior probability in its favor that science can or at least will be able to explain that observations naturally. Moreover, I agree that we should always pursue natural explanations first and foremost (methodological naturalism), and I would also agree that the prior probability is very low for some alleged supernatural event when we are considering those cases where some well-established reference class is being included in our background knowledge and if that reference class also includes established laws of nature (all else being equal). For example, it seems that there are underlying laws that are sufficient to account for lighting, and so if someone were to report to us that a god caused one or more observations of lighting we would have to say that the prior probability of this is low because we have a well established reference class that can account for lighting that is natural in nature. However, if we the probability that we would have a particular instance of lighting is so low on any natural explanation, but high on some supernatural explanation, then the probability of the specific evidence in favor of a particular miracle claim can overcome any initial improbability. However, this argument is more about explaining some observation which is NOT scientifically understood whereas GOOD arguments for the existence of God will sometimes include premises that are supported by observations that science CAN explain such as: The universe began to exist, or the universe if fine-tuned. Bad arguments for theism sometimes include premises that appeal to 'mysteries' that are not part of our scientific knowledge of the world. This objection mainly concerns 'God of the Gaps' type arguments and I whole heartedly agree that this objection undercuts those kinds of arguments as well as pointing out that our ignorance of some observation isn't positive evidence for the existnece of God anyway.
Moreover, this type of reasoning; reasoning from known to the unknown, or from past instances to future instances is only informative for establishing a prior probability when we have a well established reference class. If we try to reason from the known to the unknown in all cases then we will not only rule out supernatural explanations, but also new scientific discoveries. For example, when we first made observations that would eventually lead us to infer the existence of black holes, we were unable to reason from the known to the unknown since we had no prior established reference class for what a black hole was. So, instead of frequencies, we used inference to the best explanation, and now we are very sure that black holes exist. However, on the basis of frequency probabilities, we might have had to ignore the specific evidence for black holes in the sense that the prior probability (in terms of frequencies) would have been so low that our specific evidence might not have been able to overcome it. So, frequencies are not some absolute tool that always help us in finding the best explanations for our observations. They will not only mislead us sometimes, but to say that we will one day have a natural explanation of all phenomena is to commit a naturalism of the gaps especially when a premise in a metaphysical argument for God's existence is supported on the basis of what we know to be true in science (e.g. the universe began to exist).
Why think that the prior improbability for a supernatural explanation is always low on this account? Indeed, the major arguments for the existence of God are immune to these sorts of frequency probablitites. In particular, many of the phenomena that are offered today (such as in the kalam argument), have to do with singular events that have never been repeated in the history of our universe, and for which there cannot be any frequency probabilities. What is the prior probability that the universe will have a natural cause? How many universes that have begun to exist to have been shown to have a natural cause? This probability is inscrutable since this event is singular, and has to do with the very origin of the laws of nature themselves whereas other phenomena like lighting, operate with a frequency and predictability according to the laws of nature which can be observed with some sort of frequency. Moreover, if the universe did begin to exist, and if the universe needs a cause, then the cause cannot be natural. This point applies to the fine-tuning argument as well.
Third, this sort of frequency probablity rules out the types of religions that claim that what regulary occurs in the universe is the result of immediate and divine causation. For example, in Norse mythology, there is a god of thunder that causes thunder. However, on theism, God is distinct from the universe, and has set up the universe to operate according to natural laws. So, it seems to me that this argument works quite well for finite godism, pantheism, etc. However, this objection doesn't rule out theism, or even necessarily constitute a low prior probability for theism.
Fourth, on a Leibnizian view of providence, we would expect the number of miralces that god performs in the universe to be as low as possible so that the theist can agree with the atheist that some observation which we currently don't understand will have a scientific explanation someday, but again, we have evidence for the existence of God based on actual features of our universe that science has established.
Fifth, while some design arguments may infer the existence of God based on the orderliness of nature (i.e. Swinburne) many arguments for the existence of God today are not BASED on the laws of nature, but rather have to do with things like the beginning of the universe, the fine-tuning of the constants and certain arbitary initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, the existence of moral facts, explaining certain historical facts about the death of Jesus, etc. which themselves are inferring to explanations that either have nothing to do with the laws of nature, or the laws of nature are not part of the specific evidence ,but rather are included in our background knowledge; they are metaphysical arguments instead of some sort of creation science.
Sixth, the very success of science is itself evidence for theism over naturalism. Take the recent discovery of the Higgs boson. The predictions about the existence of the Higgs was based on the mathematics of the standard model of particle physics! Think about that for a second. The universe is so permeated with a mathematical structure at its most fundamental level that we can predict the existence of things like the Higgs boson based on the mathematics of it all! OF ITSELF, this is better explained on theism since on theism the universe is created and patterned after the intentions of a rational mind such that other minds like ourselves can model the universe using mathematics whereas on naturalism, this feature of the universe is surprising since it didn't have to be that way, and since the universe is not the product of any sort of personal and rational being, it is very surprising indeed that the universe betrays a rational pattern which can be both discovered and which is intelligible to finite rational minds like ourselves. So, both the mathematical discoverability and intelligibility of features in our universe are better explained on theism compared to naturalism given the ultimate explanation of these respective worldviews for the universe we live in.
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