First of all, all that the evidence shows is that being embodied is a common property of minds, but that doesn't show that it's an essential property of minds. To draw the conclusion that there can be no unembodied mind you'd have to show that this is an essential property. Nobody seems to diasgree that unembodied minds are at least logically possible.
What follows from the argument is not that there probably is no unembodied divine mind, but rather, that every human being that exists probably will not have a mind independently of a brain, or that everything which is biological and has a mind, that such a mind will be identical to, or causally dependent upon a central nervous system. Or again, what follows is that everything in the universe that has a mind, will have a brain, but we can't say that probably, no unembodied mind can exist beyond the universe. Thus, this argument would be trouble for someone who thought that God was an embodied person who existed in the universe, and who allegedly had a mind independent of his body.
What follows from the argument is not that there probably is no unembodied divine mind, but rather, that every human being that exists probably will not have a mind independently of a brain, or that everything which is biological and has a mind, that such a mind will be identical to, or causally dependent upon a central nervous system. Or again, what follows is that everything in the universe that has a mind, will have a brain, but we can't say that probably, no unembodied mind can exist beyond the universe. Thus, this argument would be trouble for someone who thought that God was an embodied person who existed in the universe, and who allegedly had a mind independent of his body.
What Tooley has here is an inductive argument that only supports a physical principle (like the Second Law of Thermodynmics), as opposed to a metaphysical principle (like Being cannot come from Non-Being), about the nature of minds had by physical creatures in the universe. A parallel use of induction to derive a physical principle relevant to Tooley's argument can be seen in the following argument:
1) Every life form we know of depends on liquid water to exist.
2) Therefore, probably, all life depends on liquid water to exist.
3) Since God is alleged to exist independently of any reliance of liquid water, God probably doesn't exist.
If we take this argument and apply it to God like Tooley does with his argument, what we would say is that since God is alleged to be a form of life that exists without depending on water, we should conclude that probably, no such being exists. Clearly, this argument is faulty because all that follows is a physical principle about the dependence on water of life in the universe, but nothing of metaphysical import about the probability of a living thing that exists beyond the universe has been shown. Here is another example of Tooley's reasoning:
1) Every mind we know of is the product of evolution.
2) God, if He exists, would have a mind, but would not be a product of evolution.
3) Therefore, God probably doesn't have a mind.
4) Therefore, probably, God doesn't exist.
Again, what we have here is a physical prinicple that wouldn't speak against or for the existence of a mind beyond the universe. In this way, Tooley's argument is similar to the confusion surrounding the first law of thermodynamics which says that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. Some see this as evidence that the universe is eternal, but then that would conflict with the Big Bang Theory. In that case, science would contradict science. But what scientists realize is that the first law of thermodynamics is a physical prinicple that applies to a closed physical system, or arena, once that arena exists. In the absence of the physical universe, the first law of thermodynamics wouldn't dictate the behavior of anything. It isn't as if the first law is a metaphysical prinicple that governs the behavior of things both in and beyond the universe, if there be any such things. Rather, the first law of thermodynamics is a physical principle that would only apply to things in the universe.
To further draw out the weakness of this argument let's consider a similar argument with the same logical structure regarding abstract objects:
1) If abstract objects exist, then they are non-physical.
2) If abstract objects exist, then they have the substance of being real (they have properties).
3) Everything that exists and have the substance of being real is physical.
4) Hence, it is impossible for abstract objects to exist.
I think this parody argument shows us yet again that Tooley's argument is confusing a physical principle with a metaphysical principle. While it may be true that all human persons that exist in the universe will by necessity of physical principle, be embodied, it doesn't follow from this, that all persons that may or can exist must by necessity of metaphysical principle, be embodied. Likewise, while it may the case that what we are directly acquainted with as being real are physical things, it doesn't follow from this, that it is metaphysically impossible, or even improbable that abstract objects can exist, or even that we cannot reason to them by way of some indirect experience(s) we have of things in the world. Likewise in the case of God as a personal and unembodied being.
So then, what Tooley would need to show is that his physical principle about the minds of physical creatures, can be translated into a metaphysical princple about mind qua mind. Since his argument doesn't show this, Tooley's argument doesn't accomplish what he thinks it does; for if God exists, then we are talking about a God that transcends the universe, and is unembodied. Thus, neither the the nature of our minds, nor life's dependence on water, nor evolution speaks probabilistically against the existence of a being beyond the universe that is not embodied, does not depend on water in order to live, and didn't evolve.
Third, we have positive evidence that such an unembodied and transcendent mind does exist from the arguments of Natural Theology (particularly from the kalam cosmological argument). If we have good reason to think that the cause of the universe must be personal, then we can ask whether or not such a person is embodied or unembodied. Since the cause of the universe must be personal, and can't be embodied, then we should believe in an unembodied personal cause of the universe. So then, even if Tooley's argument was successful, we have at least one Rebutting defeater, but I do not think it is successful, given the undercutting defeaters I have supplied.
1) Every life form we know of depends on liquid water to exist.
2) Therefore, probably, all life depends on liquid water to exist.
3) Since God is alleged to exist independently of any reliance of liquid water, God probably doesn't exist.
If we take this argument and apply it to God like Tooley does with his argument, what we would say is that since God is alleged to be a form of life that exists without depending on water, we should conclude that probably, no such being exists. Clearly, this argument is faulty because all that follows is a physical principle about the dependence on water of life in the universe, but nothing of metaphysical import about the probability of a living thing that exists beyond the universe has been shown. Here is another example of Tooley's reasoning:
1) Every mind we know of is the product of evolution.
2) God, if He exists, would have a mind, but would not be a product of evolution.
3) Therefore, God probably doesn't have a mind.
4) Therefore, probably, God doesn't exist.
Again, what we have here is a physical prinicple that wouldn't speak against or for the existence of a mind beyond the universe. In this way, Tooley's argument is similar to the confusion surrounding the first law of thermodynamics which says that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. Some see this as evidence that the universe is eternal, but then that would conflict with the Big Bang Theory. In that case, science would contradict science. But what scientists realize is that the first law of thermodynamics is a physical prinicple that applies to a closed physical system, or arena, once that arena exists. In the absence of the physical universe, the first law of thermodynamics wouldn't dictate the behavior of anything. It isn't as if the first law is a metaphysical prinicple that governs the behavior of things both in and beyond the universe, if there be any such things. Rather, the first law of thermodynamics is a physical principle that would only apply to things in the universe.
To further draw out the weakness of this argument let's consider a similar argument with the same logical structure regarding abstract objects:
1) If abstract objects exist, then they are non-physical.
2) If abstract objects exist, then they have the substance of being real (they have properties).
3) Everything that exists and have the substance of being real is physical.
4) Hence, it is impossible for abstract objects to exist.
I think this parody argument shows us yet again that Tooley's argument is confusing a physical principle with a metaphysical principle. While it may be true that all human persons that exist in the universe will by necessity of physical principle, be embodied, it doesn't follow from this, that all persons that may or can exist must by necessity of metaphysical principle, be embodied. Likewise, while it may the case that what we are directly acquainted with as being real are physical things, it doesn't follow from this, that it is metaphysically impossible, or even improbable that abstract objects can exist, or even that we cannot reason to them by way of some indirect experience(s) we have of things in the world. Likewise in the case of God as a personal and unembodied being.
So then, what Tooley would need to show is that his physical principle about the minds of physical creatures, can be translated into a metaphysical princple about mind qua mind. Since his argument doesn't show this, Tooley's argument doesn't accomplish what he thinks it does; for if God exists, then we are talking about a God that transcends the universe, and is unembodied. Thus, neither the the nature of our minds, nor life's dependence on water, nor evolution speaks probabilistically against the existence of a being beyond the universe that is not embodied, does not depend on water in order to live, and didn't evolve.
Third, we have positive evidence that such an unembodied and transcendent mind does exist from the arguments of Natural Theology (particularly from the kalam cosmological argument). If we have good reason to think that the cause of the universe must be personal, then we can ask whether or not such a person is embodied or unembodied. Since the cause of the universe must be personal, and can't be embodied, then we should believe in an unembodied personal cause of the universe. So then, even if Tooley's argument was successful, we have at least one Rebutting defeater, but I do not think it is successful, given the undercutting defeaters I have supplied.
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