Paul Draper has usefully identified a fallacy of inductive reasoning he calls the "fallacy of understated evidence." According to Draper, in the context of arguments for theism and against naturalism, proponents of a theistic argument are guilty of this fallacy if they "successfully identify some general fact F about a topic X that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism, but ignore other more specific facts about X, facts that, given F, are more likely on naturalism than on theism."[1]
What makes this so interesting is Draper's assessment of how various (inductive) theistic arguments commit this fallacy. By reviewing his writings, I've compiled the following summary of Draper's assessment of the evidence, illustrating how Draper believes the fallacy of understated evidence applies in practice to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of religion.
Go to the Following Link to See a Column Chart of the Fallacy: http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2011/11/paul-draper-fallacy-of-understated.html#more
I happen to agree with Draper on this score, and it is something I noticed before Draper started writing about it, and that is why I have already been working on the 'understated evidence' on my blog.
What makes this so interesting is Draper's assessment of how various (inductive) theistic arguments commit this fallacy. By reviewing his writings, I've compiled the following summary of Draper's assessment of the evidence, illustrating how Draper believes the fallacy of understated evidence applies in practice to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of religion.
Go to the Following Link to See a Column Chart of the Fallacy: http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2011/11/paul-draper-fallacy-of-understated.html#more
I happen to agree with Draper on this score, and it is something I noticed before Draper started writing about it, and that is why I have already been working on the 'understated evidence' on my blog.
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