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Therefore, Naturalism is Very Probably False

4/24/2015

Given the posts that I have written in this section (Paul Draper’s Work), and borrowing from Draper’s structure of argumentation for showing that theism is very probably false (see attached article below), I am finally ready to give a formal argument that naturalism is very probably false:

1. There is a non-zero probability that Naturalism is necessarily false.
2. With respect to the data of good and evil, any overall advantage in accuracy that naturalism has over theism is relatively small.
3. With respect to other data, theism is much more accurate than naturalism.
4. Any other epistemic advantage that theism has over naturalism is relatively large and significant.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, Naturalism is very probably false.

For a defense of premise 1, see my post titled: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?

For a defense of premise 2, see my posts titled: Flourishing and Languishing of Sentient Beings, Evolution is Antecedently More Probable on Naturalism, Pain and Pleasure, and Limited Altruism, and Limited Moral and Religious Knowledge, and the Systematic Lack of Any Discernable Moral Ends.

For a defense of premise 3, see my post titled: The Fallacy of Understated Evidence.

For a defense of premise 4, see the article attached below by Paul Draper, and my post titled: An Emergent Case for Theism

The CONCLUSION is a bit tricky. Theism is just one of the ways in which naturalism can be false. Thus, the falsity of naturalism must be at least as probable as the truth of theism. But then it does follow that if theism is much more probable than naturalism, then naturalism is very probably false.

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Limited Altruism, and Limited Moral, and Religious Knowledge, and the Systematic Lack of Any Discernable Moral Ends

4/21/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Four final arguments Draper has that are directly related to the implications of Darwinian evolution are as follows:

“Consider, for example, what we know about the good of knowledge (and the corresponding evil of ignorance). Human beings know a lot about their immediate environment and about other matters upon which their survival directly depends. Our cognitive faculties are, however, much less reliable when it comes to moral and religious matters. Surely this is much more surprising on theism than on (Darwinian) naturalism.

Or consider the moral qualities of human beings. Humans are as a rule very strongly disposed--I'm tempted to say "hard-wired"--to act selfishly. They are instinctively much more concerned about their own interests than about the interests of others. They do possess some altruistic tendencies, but these are typically very limited. This combination of a deeply ingrained selfishness and limited altruism can be given a plausible Darwinian explanation, but is very hard to understand if, for example, God wants human beings, through the exercise of their free wills, to make substantial moral progress in their short time on earth.

Generally speaking, the pattern of good and evil in the world appears quite random from a moral point of view. It does not systematically promote or reflect any discernible moral ends. This fact is further evidence for naturalism, because, while it is compatible with theism, it is exactly what one would expect on naturalism. As David Hume wrote, "The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children." Hume (being dead) will not object if I replace his colorful appeal to a "blind nature impregnated by a great vivifying principle" with the more specific thesis of Darwinian naturalism.”[1]

[1] Paul Draper, The Great Debate http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/evil.html

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The Fallacy of Understated Evidence

4/19/2015

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(Taken from Secular Outpost):

INTRODUCTION: "Paul Draper has usefully identified a fallacy of inductive reasoning he calls the 'fallacy of understated evidence.' According to Draper, in the context of arguments for theism and against naturalism, proponents of a theistic argument are guilty of this fallacy if they 'successfully identify some general fact F about a topic X that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism, but ignore other more specific facts about X, facts that, given F, are more likely on naturalism than on theism.'[1]

What makes this so interesting is Draper's assessment of how various (inductive) theistic arguments commit this fallacy. By reviewing his writings, I've compiled the following summary of Draper's assessment of the evidence, illustrating how Draper believes the fallacy of understated evidence applies in practice to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of religion."

Go to the Following Link to See a Column Chart of the Fallacy:http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2011/11/23/paul-draper-the-fallacy-of-understated-evidence-theism-and-naturalism/#ixzz3X7w2NlJE

--By Jeffery Jay Lowder

RESPONSE: Please see the attached document below for additional items of understated evidence (and defeaters) in red, that render theism many many times more probable than naturalism such that even if we grant all the understated evidence contained in the link above as prima facie evidence that significantly weakens, cancels, or outweighs theism, the ultima facie result is that theism is many times more probable than naturalism on our total available evidence (items in bold black font were added for fun):

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Pain and Pleasure

4/13/2015

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INTRODUCTION
A simplistic albeit accurate representation of another argument for naturalism that Draper makes can be outlined as follows (see article below for detailed version):

(C) O* is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that HI is true than on the assumption that theism is true.

(1) Given “the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems,” independent of the effect of theistic stories on P(O/theism), C is true.

(2) Theistic stories do not significantly raise P(O/theism)

*O includes three facts: (1) moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that is biologically useful, (2) nonmoral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that is biologically useful, and (3) sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically gratuitous. See the article below for Draper's detailed argument:

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Evolution is Antecedently More Probable On Naturalism

4/12/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Draper’s next observation about the nature and condition of sentient life on Earth is that it evolved, and that it evolved by means of natural selection acting on random genetic mutations. This fact actually makes the flourishing and languishing of sentient beings even worse on theism because a Darwinian world is inevitably cruel in the sense that natural selection cannot operate unless there are winners and losers. So then, given naturalism, and evolution:

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Flourishing and Languishing of Sentient Life

4/11/2015

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INTRODUCTION
After arguing that theism is less plausible than naturalism (which I have dealt with in my Who Bears the Burden Proof Post), Draper then argues that naturalism has greater predictive power than theism with respect to evidence E:

“For a variety of biological and ecological reasons, organisms compete for survival, with some having an advantage in the struggle for survival over others; as a result, many organisms, including many sentient beings, never flourish because they die before maturity, many others barely survive, but languish for most or all of their lives, and those that reach maturity and flourish for much of their lives usually languish in old age; in the case of human beings and some nonhuman animals as well, languishing often involves intense or prolonged suffering.”[1]

The purpose of this post will be to show that God has known moral reasons for allowing E that include moral and non-moral facts.

[1] Paul Draper, The Great Debate, Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil, http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/evil.html

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Who Bears The Burden of Proof?

4/10/2015

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INTRODUCTION
Paul Draper has developed an argument that theists, but not atheists, bear a burden of proof based on his theory of intrinsic probability. The purpose of this post will be to determine the soundness of this argument.

INTRINSIC PROBABILITY
The intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is the prior probability of a hypothesis independent of any data or background knowledge. It tells you the absolute prior probability of a hypothesis before we consider the evidence for that hypothesis, “If we abstract from all factors extrinsic to a hypothesis, then the only thing that could affect the epistemic probability of that hypothesis is how much it says and how well what it says fits together. No other factors affecting probability could be intrinsic to the hypothesis.”[1] There are two criteria for assessing the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis, coherence and modesty:

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Therefore, Naturalism is Very Probably False

Limited Altruism, and Limited Moral, and Religious Knowledge, and the Systematic Lack of Any Discernable Moral Ends

The Fallacy of Understated Evidence

Pain and Pleasure

Evolution is Antecedently More Probable On Naturalism﻿

Flourishing and Languishing of Sentient Life

Who Bears The Burden of Proof?

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Evolution is Antecedently More Probable On Naturalism