INTRODUCTION
After arguing that theism is less plausible than naturalism (which I have dealt with in my Who Bears the Burden Proof Post), Draper then argues that naturalism has greater predictive power than theism with respect to evidence E:
“For a variety of biological and ecological reasons, organisms compete for survival, with some having an advantage in the struggle for survival over others; as a result, many organisms, including many sentient beings, never flourish because they die before maturity, many others barely survive, but languish for most or all of their lives, and those that reach maturity and flourish for much of their lives usually languish in old age; in the case of human beings and some nonhuman animals as well, languishing often involves intense or prolonged suffering.”[1]
The purpose of this post will be to show that God has known moral reasons for allowing E that include moral and non-moral facts.
[1] Paul Draper, The Great Debate, Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil, http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/evil.html
After arguing that theism is less plausible than naturalism (which I have dealt with in my Who Bears the Burden Proof Post), Draper then argues that naturalism has greater predictive power than theism with respect to evidence E:
“For a variety of biological and ecological reasons, organisms compete for survival, with some having an advantage in the struggle for survival over others; as a result, many organisms, including many sentient beings, never flourish because they die before maturity, many others barely survive, but languish for most or all of their lives, and those that reach maturity and flourish for much of their lives usually languish in old age; in the case of human beings and some nonhuman animals as well, languishing often involves intense or prolonged suffering.”[1]
The purpose of this post will be to show that God has known moral reasons for allowing E that include moral and non-moral facts.
[1] Paul Draper, The Great Debate, Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil, http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/evil.html
FLOURISHING AND LANGUISHING OF SENTIENT ORGANISMS
Draper offers an argument to think E confirms naturalism over theism in three stages, “…from a theistic perspective, it also makes perfectly good sense to say that sentient organisms are supposed to flourish. (Or at least this would make perfectly good sense if we did not already know that countless sentient beings do not flourish.) The argument for this has three premises. First, almost all sentient organisms are capable of flourishing in biologically realistic circumstances. This is proven by the fact that many do flourish and by the fact that the differences between those that do flourish and those that do not are in almost all cases relatively small. Second, sentient organisms have a good--they certainly can be benefited or harmed--and the failure to flourish is incompatible with achieving that good. Third, a perfect God, being perfect in moral goodness, could not care more deeply about sentient beings achieving their good, and being perfect in power and knowledge, could not be better positioned to ensure that sentient beings achieve their good. Therefore, the fact, reported by E, that countless living organisms, including sentient beings, never flourish at all and countless others flourish only briefly is extremely surprising given theism. It is not what one would expect to find in a living world created by a perfect God.”[1]
ASSESSMENT OF DRAPER’S ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO NONHUMAN SENTIENCE
FIRST PREMISE: Consider his first premise, that ALL sentient organisms are capable of flourishing in biologically realistic circumstances.
a. Notice he neither explains what biologically realistic circumstances are, nor does he provide any citation to scientific literature that supports or explains what such circumstances would be like. His second reason is again a mere assertion with no empirical data supporting it. Indeed, his description of evidence E says that most sentient life doesn’t flourish which is contrary to his support for premise one that many do flourish. In any case, it is a non-sequitur to argue that because many do flourish, that this proves that all can flourish given small changes. As is common with Draper, he makes claims with empirical consequences that he gives no empirical support for. In fact, it is not uncommon as with this case for Draper to confidently proclaim that something is an empirical fact when in fact, the actual empirical data contradicts his claim. When I took an evolution course at university, I asked my professor what would happen if the biological circumstances were such that all sentient organisms flourished. His reply was that evolution wouldn’t produce complexity. This implies that the sentient organisms cited in E by Draper wouldn’t exist if his alleged biologically real circumstances were brought about by SMALL changes! Therefore, Draper’s claim that ALL sentient creatures are capable of flourishing given SMALL changes is empirically false, and thus, his entire argument for naturalism predicting E better than theism is wrong.
b. Another assumption Draper makes is that God can design any laws of physics He wants. However, for all we know, this probably isn’t true. As Brian Ellis explains, “…the idea that the laws of physics are contingent, and superimposed on intrinsically passive things that have identities that are independent of the laws of their behavior, is one that lies very uneasily with modern science.”[5] Hence, if scientific essentialism is the correct account of the laws of nature, then “Not even an omnipotent God could change the laws of nature without changing the things on which they are supposed to act.”[6] A few reasons to think scientific essentialism is true are the counterfactual regularity of the laws of nature, and the fact that the only things without essences (biological creatures), do not have laws of nature that explain their behavior. This point would undercut Draper’s first premise as well since ecosystem stability requires a means to regulate the different levels of organisms. Draper would object that antecedently, naturalism would predict that the laws of nature would be necessary, but on theism, we would predict the opposite. Even if that is correct, once we learn that the laws are necessary and include that as an item of our background knowledge, it follows that this fact raises the probability of theism to be on equal footing with naturalism, given this observation because not even an omnipotent God can do what is metaphysically impossible.
Draper would also object that this would do damage to the fine-tuning argument since given his theory of intrinsic probability, uniformity is more likely than variety and so it is antecedently more likely that the laws, constants, and initial conditions are necessary as well. However, if the laws are necessary and indeterministic as our best science seems to indicate, then it is antecedently more probable that the laws, constants, and initial conditions are necessarily indeterministic which means the fine-tuning argument would be completely unscathed. In fact, I think it would be strengthened, but that is another topic.
c. The most fundamental assumption Draper makes is that God didn't have to use evolution, Darwinian or not. However, please see my entry titled: Evolution is Antecedently More Probable on Naturalism which challenges this assumption.
SECOND PREMISE/THIRD PREMISE: In support of his second premise, Draper claims that sentient organisms can be harmed or benefited, and hence, when they are not benefited, they do not flourish. Given God's goodness, power, and knowledge (third premise), sentient beings are supposed to flourish (conclusion).
a. We have already seen two reasons to doubt that God could bring it about that all sentient beings flourish. If either one or both arguments above are plausible, then they would also undercut premise 3 of Draper's argument. However, even if God could bring it about, there are good reasons to doubt that God should, because of his goodness, bring this state of affairs about. Notice that premise two of Draper's argument assumes that hedonistic accounts of welfare are the proper framework to make sense of flourishing and languishing. However, hedonistic accounts of welfare are hopelessly flawed. The most widespread theories of welfare today are accounts that blend subjective desires with objective goods. These objective goods include a life that integrates, and contributes to the good, the true, and the beautiful. Notice right away however, that objective goods are non-natural entities which are better predicted by theism compared to naturalism.[2] Moreover, and most damning, this implies that applying the categories of flourishing and harming to sentient beings that aren’t capable of living lives characterized by objective goods and harms is misplaced. To wit, only moral agents are capable of flourishing and languishing, which implies that all sentient organisms other than human beings do not flourish and languish properly speaking!
b. It gets worse for Draper here. Even the subjective desires necessary to speak of sentient organisms flourishing and languishing are probably absent in all sentient organisms except humans:
(i) The death of a person is bad for her only because it frustrates her desires and plans for the future.
(ii) Therefore, death is bad in general only because it frustrates desires and plans.
(iii) Animals do not have desires and plans for the future.
(iv) Therefore, animals’ deaths are not bad for them.[3]
Because animals do not have a self-narrative it is very difficult to see why death is bad for them. Hence, his second premise and his third premise presuppose a false theory of well-being.
One could reply that a PERSON could live in the moment, and not have plans or desires for the future and hence death would still be bad for them. However, as Tooley argues, “We have been considering three closely related questions, “To what extent are non-human animals persons? To what extent do they have a right to continued existence? To what extent do they have moral status? I have attempted to show that most arguments that have been advanced in this area are unsound?...On the other hand, it seems to me that familiar attempts to show that animals do have moral status, or are persons, or have a right to continued existence, are also unsuccessful…If, as I am inclined to think, the thoughts needed must involve concepts as those of causation, and of a persisting self, it seems to me unlikely that such thoughts can be expressed imagistically…Even if a continuing self whose mental life is unified over time by thinking that involves only images does have moral status, that moral status is not likely to be very significant.”[4]
Therefore, because sentient beings (other than humans) do not languish or flourish in a non-hedonistic manner, Draper’s argument doesn't raise the probability of naturalism to be higher than theism.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The moral considerations that justify God in permitting E are that animals aren't persons, they do not have a right to continued existence, and because of this it is unlikely they have a moral status, or at least it is unlikely that they have a significant moral status. Moreover, flourishing and languishing presuppose a non-naturalistic ontology of objective goods which support theism over naturalism. We also saw that flourishing and languishing are categories that do not apply to animals.
The non-moral considerations that justify God in permitting E are scientific essentialism, and the necessity of evolution (and probably Darwinian evolution at that).
These considerations undercut all three of Draper's premises that make up this argument for naturalism from the Flourishing and Languishing of Sentient Beings.
[1] ibid
[2] William Lauinger, The Neutralization of Draper-Style Evidential Arguments From Evil, Faith and Philosophy (Vol. 31, Issue 3, July 2014), 303-324.
[3] Elizabeth Harman, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics: The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death, ed. Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, 730.
[4] Michael Tooley, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics: Are NonHuman Animals Persons?, ed. Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, 366-368.
[5] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide To The New Essentialism (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 5.
[6] ibid, 5.
Draper offers an argument to think E confirms naturalism over theism in three stages, “…from a theistic perspective, it also makes perfectly good sense to say that sentient organisms are supposed to flourish. (Or at least this would make perfectly good sense if we did not already know that countless sentient beings do not flourish.) The argument for this has three premises. First, almost all sentient organisms are capable of flourishing in biologically realistic circumstances. This is proven by the fact that many do flourish and by the fact that the differences between those that do flourish and those that do not are in almost all cases relatively small. Second, sentient organisms have a good--they certainly can be benefited or harmed--and the failure to flourish is incompatible with achieving that good. Third, a perfect God, being perfect in moral goodness, could not care more deeply about sentient beings achieving their good, and being perfect in power and knowledge, could not be better positioned to ensure that sentient beings achieve their good. Therefore, the fact, reported by E, that countless living organisms, including sentient beings, never flourish at all and countless others flourish only briefly is extremely surprising given theism. It is not what one would expect to find in a living world created by a perfect God.”[1]
ASSESSMENT OF DRAPER’S ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO NONHUMAN SENTIENCE
FIRST PREMISE: Consider his first premise, that ALL sentient organisms are capable of flourishing in biologically realistic circumstances.
a. Notice he neither explains what biologically realistic circumstances are, nor does he provide any citation to scientific literature that supports or explains what such circumstances would be like. His second reason is again a mere assertion with no empirical data supporting it. Indeed, his description of evidence E says that most sentient life doesn’t flourish which is contrary to his support for premise one that many do flourish. In any case, it is a non-sequitur to argue that because many do flourish, that this proves that all can flourish given small changes. As is common with Draper, he makes claims with empirical consequences that he gives no empirical support for. In fact, it is not uncommon as with this case for Draper to confidently proclaim that something is an empirical fact when in fact, the actual empirical data contradicts his claim. When I took an evolution course at university, I asked my professor what would happen if the biological circumstances were such that all sentient organisms flourished. His reply was that evolution wouldn’t produce complexity. This implies that the sentient organisms cited in E by Draper wouldn’t exist if his alleged biologically real circumstances were brought about by SMALL changes! Therefore, Draper’s claim that ALL sentient creatures are capable of flourishing given SMALL changes is empirically false, and thus, his entire argument for naturalism predicting E better than theism is wrong.
b. Another assumption Draper makes is that God can design any laws of physics He wants. However, for all we know, this probably isn’t true. As Brian Ellis explains, “…the idea that the laws of physics are contingent, and superimposed on intrinsically passive things that have identities that are independent of the laws of their behavior, is one that lies very uneasily with modern science.”[5] Hence, if scientific essentialism is the correct account of the laws of nature, then “Not even an omnipotent God could change the laws of nature without changing the things on which they are supposed to act.”[6] A few reasons to think scientific essentialism is true are the counterfactual regularity of the laws of nature, and the fact that the only things without essences (biological creatures), do not have laws of nature that explain their behavior. This point would undercut Draper’s first premise as well since ecosystem stability requires a means to regulate the different levels of organisms. Draper would object that antecedently, naturalism would predict that the laws of nature would be necessary, but on theism, we would predict the opposite. Even if that is correct, once we learn that the laws are necessary and include that as an item of our background knowledge, it follows that this fact raises the probability of theism to be on equal footing with naturalism, given this observation because not even an omnipotent God can do what is metaphysically impossible.
Draper would also object that this would do damage to the fine-tuning argument since given his theory of intrinsic probability, uniformity is more likely than variety and so it is antecedently more likely that the laws, constants, and initial conditions are necessary as well. However, if the laws are necessary and indeterministic as our best science seems to indicate, then it is antecedently more probable that the laws, constants, and initial conditions are necessarily indeterministic which means the fine-tuning argument would be completely unscathed. In fact, I think it would be strengthened, but that is another topic.
c. The most fundamental assumption Draper makes is that God didn't have to use evolution, Darwinian or not. However, please see my entry titled: Evolution is Antecedently More Probable on Naturalism which challenges this assumption.
SECOND PREMISE/THIRD PREMISE: In support of his second premise, Draper claims that sentient organisms can be harmed or benefited, and hence, when they are not benefited, they do not flourish. Given God's goodness, power, and knowledge (third premise), sentient beings are supposed to flourish (conclusion).
a. We have already seen two reasons to doubt that God could bring it about that all sentient beings flourish. If either one or both arguments above are plausible, then they would also undercut premise 3 of Draper's argument. However, even if God could bring it about, there are good reasons to doubt that God should, because of his goodness, bring this state of affairs about. Notice that premise two of Draper's argument assumes that hedonistic accounts of welfare are the proper framework to make sense of flourishing and languishing. However, hedonistic accounts of welfare are hopelessly flawed. The most widespread theories of welfare today are accounts that blend subjective desires with objective goods. These objective goods include a life that integrates, and contributes to the good, the true, and the beautiful. Notice right away however, that objective goods are non-natural entities which are better predicted by theism compared to naturalism.[2] Moreover, and most damning, this implies that applying the categories of flourishing and harming to sentient beings that aren’t capable of living lives characterized by objective goods and harms is misplaced. To wit, only moral agents are capable of flourishing and languishing, which implies that all sentient organisms other than human beings do not flourish and languish properly speaking!
b. It gets worse for Draper here. Even the subjective desires necessary to speak of sentient organisms flourishing and languishing are probably absent in all sentient organisms except humans:
(i) The death of a person is bad for her only because it frustrates her desires and plans for the future.
(ii) Therefore, death is bad in general only because it frustrates desires and plans.
(iii) Animals do not have desires and plans for the future.
(iv) Therefore, animals’ deaths are not bad for them.[3]
Because animals do not have a self-narrative it is very difficult to see why death is bad for them. Hence, his second premise and his third premise presuppose a false theory of well-being.
One could reply that a PERSON could live in the moment, and not have plans or desires for the future and hence death would still be bad for them. However, as Tooley argues, “We have been considering three closely related questions, “To what extent are non-human animals persons? To what extent do they have a right to continued existence? To what extent do they have moral status? I have attempted to show that most arguments that have been advanced in this area are unsound?...On the other hand, it seems to me that familiar attempts to show that animals do have moral status, or are persons, or have a right to continued existence, are also unsuccessful…If, as I am inclined to think, the thoughts needed must involve concepts as those of causation, and of a persisting self, it seems to me unlikely that such thoughts can be expressed imagistically…Even if a continuing self whose mental life is unified over time by thinking that involves only images does have moral status, that moral status is not likely to be very significant.”[4]
Therefore, because sentient beings (other than humans) do not languish or flourish in a non-hedonistic manner, Draper’s argument doesn't raise the probability of naturalism to be higher than theism.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The moral considerations that justify God in permitting E are that animals aren't persons, they do not have a right to continued existence, and because of this it is unlikely they have a moral status, or at least it is unlikely that they have a significant moral status. Moreover, flourishing and languishing presuppose a non-naturalistic ontology of objective goods which support theism over naturalism. We also saw that flourishing and languishing are categories that do not apply to animals.
The non-moral considerations that justify God in permitting E are scientific essentialism, and the necessity of evolution (and probably Darwinian evolution at that).
These considerations undercut all three of Draper's premises that make up this argument for naturalism from the Flourishing and Languishing of Sentient Beings.
[1] ibid
[2] William Lauinger, The Neutralization of Draper-Style Evidential Arguments From Evil, Faith and Philosophy (Vol. 31, Issue 3, July 2014), 303-324.
[3] Elizabeth Harman, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics: The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death, ed. Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, 730.
[4] Michael Tooley, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics: Are NonHuman Animals Persons?, ed. Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, 366-368.
[5] Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide To The New Essentialism (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 5.
[6] ibid, 5.
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