The following article gives an interesting answer:
"Can We Have a Friend in Jesus? An Aristotelian Analysis," Philosophia Christi
"Can We Have a Friend in Jesus? An Aristotelian Analysis," Philosophia Christi
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http://www.academia.edu/1958081/WHAT_SIN_IS_A_DIFFERENTIAL_ANALYSIS
Primary reading: • Basil Mitchell, ‘How is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing?’, Religious Studies 20 (1984): 165-73. • Ingolf Dalferth, ‘How is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing?, Religious Studies 20 (1984): 175- 89. • Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘Sin as Uncleanness’, Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 1-27. The following article can be used to meet this objection I think:
"Defusing the Demandingness Objection" Presented by Matthew Braddock, Duke University Abstract: An indomitable resistance to demanding moral views takes this form: The Demandingness Objection (Premise) Moral view V demands too much of us. (Premise) If a moral view demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. (Conclusion) So, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this sort dog major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent normative principles and particular claims in applied ethics and political philosophy. This paper does the following: (i) it clarifies and distinguishes between various demandingness objections, (ii) constructs a formidable and philosophically interesting form of the demandingness objection that targets a wide scope of moral views, and (iii) defuses this important objection by developing an argument from unreliability the form of which may, interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of philosophy. 
Decosimo, David. Intrinsic Goodness and Contingency, Resemblance and Particularity: Two Criticisms of Robert Adams's Finite and Infinite Goods", Studies in Christian Ethics 25 (4):418-441 (2012)
Mark C. Murphy, God and Moral Law: http://philreligion.nd.edu/assets/44796/0910lecture.pdf
4.4 Omniscience and Cardinality: Patrick Grim (1988) has objected to the possibility of omniscience on the basis of an argument that concludes that there is no set of all truths. The argument (by reductio) that there is no set T of all truths goes by way of Cantor's Theorem. Suppose there were such a set. Then consider its power set, ℘(T), that is, the set of all subsets of T. Now take some some truth t1. For each member of ℘(T), either t1 is a member of that set or it is not. There will thus correspond to each member of ℘(T) a further truth, specifying whether t1 is or is not a member of that set. Accordingly, there are at least as many truths as there are members of ℘(T). But Cantor's Theorem tells us that there must be more members of ℘(T) than there are of T. So T is not the set of all truths, after all. The assumption that it is leads to the conclusion that it is not. Now Grim thinks that this is a problem for omniscience because he thinks that a being could know all truths only if there were a set of all truths. In reply, Plantinga (Grim and Plantinga, 1993) holds that knowledge of all truths does not require the existence of a set of all truths. He notes that a parallel argument shows that there is no set of all propositions, yet it is intelligible to say, for example, that every proposition is either true or false. A more technical reply in terms of levels of sets has been given by Simmons (1993), but it goes beyond the scope of this entry. See also (Wainwright 2010, 50–51). --Summary of the debate taken from SEP entry on Omniscience I think another solution can be found here:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-god-know-an-actually-infinite-number-of-things
Mike Rea from Notre Dame University has a model of the incarnation that is very innovative and unique. I asked him this question: If his model of the incarnation could be adapted to fit a physicalist understanding of human nature? and he said: 'It depends a bit on what you think physicalism comes to. If Aquinas counts as a physicalist on your view then yes, the model very easily accommodates that view. If physicalism implies (e.g.) that there are no souls and no non-physical powers (whatever those might be), then the view *might* have trouble. I'm not sure, though. I don't think that there's anything central to the model that obviously contradicts "physicalism about human nature"; but neither can I demonstrate that it doesn't.' The importance of this for resurection has to do with the meaning of the resurrection that is often applied on the basis of Jesus' teaching and radical divine self-understanding. That meaning of course has to do with the after the fact inference that Jesus was the personal emodiment of YHWH, and the resurrection serves as the divine stamp on Jesus' radical self-concept. But, if it is impossible for Jesus to be god incarnate given one's physicalist leanings on humna nature, then we would have a real problem on our hands. Thus, I have included Mike Rea's very helpful article:
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