The argument for Christ's impeccability can be formulated as follows:
1) God, as an essentially perfect being, cannot sin.
2) Jesus is God.
3) Therefore, Jesus cannot sin.
Someone clever might protest that just as Jesus was omnipotent with respect to his divine nature, but limited in power with respect to his human nature, that the same applies in the case of moral perfection. Jesus was sinless with respect to his divine nature, but not necessarily with respect to his human nature. Two responses: 1) This objection is based on a false analogy since sinning is something a person does, and the human nature of Christ, although limited, is not itself a person. 2) A more radical view, and one that I wouldn't recommend, is to bite the bullett and say that Jesus could have sinned, but God created Him in the circumstances with the right set of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom such that God knew through His middle knowledge that Christ would not sin, even though He could.
But then the question remains: How could Jesus actually be tempted if He couldn't and wouldn't sin?
This question has an implicit argument and central premise contained within it that would be something like the following: In order to be truly tempted by something, then you must actually be able to act on that temptation. However, though intuitive, this premise is false. To give a realistic example, consider waking up in the middle of the night and craving a midnight snack (i.e. a chocalate cake in the fridge downstairs). Now, you are sorely tempted to go downstairs and munch out, but you are also on a diet plan that doesn't permit eating midnight snacks. With much struggle, you overcome the temptation, and go back to bed. However, little did you know that your son had already gotten up slightly before you in the middle of the night and eaten the rest of the chocolate cake that you were tempted to eat. So, even though you couldn't act on your temptation, you nonetheless were actually tempted and had to genuinely struggle to overcome that temptation.
I'm sure you noticed that this illustration only works if we assume a certain degree of cognitive limitation being in place for Jesus just as it was for the person who didn't know that the cake was no longer in the fridge. But of course, it isn't at all implausible to think that Jesus had an ordinary human consciousness and knowledge that allowed him to grow in wisdom, maturity, and the rest such that he could also be unaware of his impeccability and genuinely struggle with temptation.
Lastly, someone may ask: If Jesus was incapable of sinning, then how is this compatible with our ordinary understanding of freedom as the ability to choose between opposites (i.e. good and evil).
Very simple, libertarian freedom DOES NOT require the notion of contra-possibility. Here is a famous thought experiment proposed by Harry Frankfurt wherein it is demonstrated that all that is required for libertarian freedom is that a person be the ultimate source of their decisions without any external causal conditions determining their choice:
‘Imagine a man with electrodes secretly implanted in his brain who is presented with a choice of doing either A or B [for our purposes, we’ll let A stand for good and B stand for evil]. The electrodes are inactive so long as the man chooses A; but if he were going to choose B, then the electrodes would switch on and force him to choose A. If the electrodes fire, causing him to choose A, his choice of A is clearly not a free choice. But supposed that the man really wants to do A and chooses it of his own volition. In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at all and have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the absence of any causally determining factors of his choosing A. This conception of libertarian freedom has the advantage of explaining how it is that God’s choosing to do good is free, even though it is impossible for God to choose sin, namely, His choosing is undetermined by external causal constraints. Thus, libertarian freedom of the will does not require the ability to choose other than as one chooses.’
In the case of Jesus, he could freely resist temptation and be morally responsible for it if we understand libertarian free will in the manner above.
1) God, as an essentially perfect being, cannot sin.
2) Jesus is God.
3) Therefore, Jesus cannot sin.
Someone clever might protest that just as Jesus was omnipotent with respect to his divine nature, but limited in power with respect to his human nature, that the same applies in the case of moral perfection. Jesus was sinless with respect to his divine nature, but not necessarily with respect to his human nature. Two responses: 1) This objection is based on a false analogy since sinning is something a person does, and the human nature of Christ, although limited, is not itself a person. 2) A more radical view, and one that I wouldn't recommend, is to bite the bullett and say that Jesus could have sinned, but God created Him in the circumstances with the right set of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom such that God knew through His middle knowledge that Christ would not sin, even though He could.
But then the question remains: How could Jesus actually be tempted if He couldn't and wouldn't sin?
This question has an implicit argument and central premise contained within it that would be something like the following: In order to be truly tempted by something, then you must actually be able to act on that temptation. However, though intuitive, this premise is false. To give a realistic example, consider waking up in the middle of the night and craving a midnight snack (i.e. a chocalate cake in the fridge downstairs). Now, you are sorely tempted to go downstairs and munch out, but you are also on a diet plan that doesn't permit eating midnight snacks. With much struggle, you overcome the temptation, and go back to bed. However, little did you know that your son had already gotten up slightly before you in the middle of the night and eaten the rest of the chocolate cake that you were tempted to eat. So, even though you couldn't act on your temptation, you nonetheless were actually tempted and had to genuinely struggle to overcome that temptation.
I'm sure you noticed that this illustration only works if we assume a certain degree of cognitive limitation being in place for Jesus just as it was for the person who didn't know that the cake was no longer in the fridge. But of course, it isn't at all implausible to think that Jesus had an ordinary human consciousness and knowledge that allowed him to grow in wisdom, maturity, and the rest such that he could also be unaware of his impeccability and genuinely struggle with temptation.
Lastly, someone may ask: If Jesus was incapable of sinning, then how is this compatible with our ordinary understanding of freedom as the ability to choose between opposites (i.e. good and evil).
Very simple, libertarian freedom DOES NOT require the notion of contra-possibility. Here is a famous thought experiment proposed by Harry Frankfurt wherein it is demonstrated that all that is required for libertarian freedom is that a person be the ultimate source of their decisions without any external causal conditions determining their choice:
‘Imagine a man with electrodes secretly implanted in his brain who is presented with a choice of doing either A or B [for our purposes, we’ll let A stand for good and B stand for evil]. The electrodes are inactive so long as the man chooses A; but if he were going to choose B, then the electrodes would switch on and force him to choose A. If the electrodes fire, causing him to choose A, his choice of A is clearly not a free choice. But supposed that the man really wants to do A and chooses it of his own volition. In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at all and have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the absence of any causally determining factors of his choosing A. This conception of libertarian freedom has the advantage of explaining how it is that God’s choosing to do good is free, even though it is impossible for God to choose sin, namely, His choosing is undetermined by external causal constraints. Thus, libertarian freedom of the will does not require the ability to choose other than as one chooses.’
In the case of Jesus, he could freely resist temptation and be morally responsible for it if we understand libertarian free will in the manner above.
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