

Whose view is simpler?

If naturalism entails HI which is simpler than naturalism, then naturalism entails at least 6 claims, just like Christian theism entails supernaturalism, but that entails that our two hypotheses are equal in simplicity.

Does God exist necessarily?

He says things always come from pre-existing materials?

No, more space begins to exist without pre-existing materials, and he never responded to my other two objections.

He says timelessness without creation involves time.

There cannot be time in the absence of changes, and a timeless being is changeless which entails there would be no time without creation.

He says BGV theorem doesn't prove an absolute beginning

BGV shows the universe probably began to exist, and can't be factually necessary, it needn't prove this because I am arguing that God exists with factual necessity, not logical necessity.

He says I haven't shown the laws are necessary on theism.

I did give two reasons to think they are necessary, and since quantum indeterminacy is part of our best science, they are uniformly, and necessarily probabilistic, which is what you would expect on theism because such laws give God almost unlimited freedom to act in the world.

He says necessary laws imply necessary constants:

No, cosmologists have shown that the symmetry breaking events that caused the constants, quantities, and initial conditions to fall out of the big bang were settled randomly, and could have resulted in a lifeless universe no matter the status of the laws.

Do all my objections presuppose necessary laws?:

Of the 50+ objections I have made against Mr. Lowders' case only four appeal to what he calls naturalistic theism. Moreover, he seems to agree that if the laws are necessarily probabilistic as I have shown, then all of his arguments are undercut while none of mine are!

He says I didn't give reasons to expect physical matter and intelligibility on theism?:

I have given 7 reasons from the formational economy of the universe and from God's goodness and free choice in all possible worlds which he didn't respond to in his most recent speech.

He says some math always applies,

Perhaps, but the point was to show a universe that is significantly less far-reaching in aesthetic *a priori* mathematical application like ours, and I showed there are literally an infinite number of universes unlike ours in this respect, and he didn't respond.

Are fine-tuning for discoverability and life one argument:

No, these two can come apart because if the entropy of our universe was a little higher we would be able to survive longer, but this would negatively impact discoverability, but it just so happens to be at a level that optimally promotes both longevity and discoverability, which means these two arguments doubly add to the probability of theism.

He says God didn't need common ancestry:

Sadly, he simply doesn't understand my argument still. He didn't respond to my argument that evolution is actually evidence for theism.

Do animals suffer just like humans?

No, only .00001 percent of animals are self-aware, and even they aren't as self-aware as humans. He didn't respond to my no-right- to life defeater. And Original sin isn't required for Christian theism to be true, read some Irenaeus.

He says tragedies are the rule:

He may be right, but he hasn't empirically shown this, and I already gave two defeaters which he never responded to.

He admits people are resilient and comforted in tragedies

And I showed these two mechanisms are surprising on naturalism, he never responded.

But, Christian theism has the resources to gloriously, and triumphantly defeat horrific tragedies.

i. In his life and death on the cross Jesus participates in horrors and tragedies as an innocent, but triumphantly and gloriously overcomes horrific tragedies in his resurrection so horrors are now seen as a secure point of identification with the crucified Jesus that engulfs any horrific tragedy with glorious and triumphant positive meaning.

Do embodied moral agents need to be maximally powerful:

I never claimed that, what I said is that his expectation of embodied moral agents with a soul on theism would require agents that can do miracles which for all we know would require maximal power, and he never responded, and this shows the limitations on our freedom aren't surprising on theism.

Does moral responsibility require contingent laws and libertarian freedom:

Nothing about moral responsibility on compatibilism requires contingent laws or even libertarian free will, only a reasons-responsive mechanism which means embodied moral agency supports theism apart from fine-tuning.

Did I deny probability calculus?:

No, given the counterexamples to countable additivity the idea is that it doesn't apply to fine-tuning probabilities, even though it is mathematically consistent. Moreover, countable additivity only applies to logical probability, but our arguments rely on epistemic probability.

He says universal biological desires determine the good:

On his view, had we desired to murder, rape, and steal given a different evolutionary inheritance, than that would be good and right. But, since reason teaches us that such things cannot be right, what is surprising is that the only robust moral agents to come out of evolution are the same agents whose instinctual beliefs and desires are predominantly amenable to rationally reflective goods.

Could God have reduced ethical disagreement:

I already gave 8 reasons that showed why this is unlikely and he never responded.

Am I willfully blind?

I gave 3 reasons to doubt an entailment of the hiddenness argument, and he never responded. Moreover, because of evolution our intellectual and emotional dispositions cannot be set up the way this argument presupposes.

Is belief that prior to belief in?

Psychologists identify experiential intimacy as that kind of meaningful relationship via shared activity that doesn't require being aware of the other. I shared a Christian model of this with Schellenberg, and he said it was coherent.

Did I speculate God would raise Jesus?

He grants that if we add those facts I mentioned about Jesus into our background knowledge then it is likely God WOULD raise Jesus despite the decay of others, but he thinks they are merely *a priori* speculations. However they actually are *aposteriori* historical facts accepted by the majority of historians. Also, naturalistic explanations are astronomically low and cancel out this objection.

Can we infer an incorruptible body.

I gave an inference to the best explanation argument, and judging by those criteria it is plausible Jesus was raised with an incorruptible body.

What we are left with are 12 good arguments for Christian theism, and zero for naturalism.