

1) Doesn't supervenience ground the necessity of objective moral values and duties and eliminate the need for God?

While it seems true that necessary truths can supervene on contingent states of affairs, and I would even agree that the properties of wrongness and rightness supervene necessarily on certain contingent states of affairs in the world I do not think supervenience is an adequate ground of objective moral values and duties. The reason is that at least some moral facts seem to be necessarily true, non-natural, and since the universe is contingent, nothing in the universe can ground moral facts because they exist necessarily. Moreover, since people are explanatorily prior to moral facts, it seems to me that by Ockham's Razor we can say that the most plausible ground for moral facts is a singular, necessary, non-natural, person. Moreover, since evil is a privation of good, and since moral facts aren't arbitrary, and they aren't most plausibly construed as existing independently of a person, the person that grounds moral facts must be good by nature.

- 1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature, or in an external cause.
- 2) Moral facts *exist*.
- 3) Moral facts exist by the necessity of their own nature.
- 4) Since the universe is contingent, there is nothing in the universe that can explain the existence of moral facts.
- 5) The explanation of moral facts is either natural, or non-natural.
- 6) The explanation of moral facts cannot be natural (Since the universe is contingent).
- 7) The explanation of moral facts must be non-natural.
- 8) The explanation of moral facts must either be abstract objects, or a non-natural person.
- 9) Abstract objects do not exist, and/or persons are explanatorily prior to moral facts.
- 10) Therefore, a non-natural person explains the existence of moral facts.
- 11) Moral facts cannot exist independently of this non-natural personal entity, nor are these moral facts arbitrary since they are necessarily true.
- 12) This non-natural person entity must explain the existence of moral facts by its very nature.

13) Evil is a privation of good.

14) Therefore, this non-natural personal entity must be good by nature.

15) Therefore, there exists a non-natural necessarily existent being that is good by nature.

Premise (1) seems intuitive and to exhaust the possibilities for explanations of things that exist.

Premise 2 is the majority view called moral realism.

Premise 3 is crucial. I believe it is true because some moral facts are necessarily true (i.e. it is wrong to rape children), and since moral facts not only have a necessary truth value, but also exist, it seems to follow that moral facts must exist necessarily in order to be true in every possible world.

Premise 4 can be defended by appealing to philosophical and scientific arguments that the universe is finite in the past.

Premise 5 exhausts the possibilities.

Premise 6 follows from 1-4.

Premise 7 follows from 1-6.

Premise 8 exhausts the plausible alternatives for necessary beings.

Premise 9 can be supported by arguments against the existence of abstract objects, and/or it seems eminently reasonable that some moral reasons cannot be given without presupposing that persons exist.

Premise 10 can follow from 1-9 and is plausible given Ockham's Razor

Premises 11-12 involve the Euthyphro Dilemma and a solution to the dilemma.

Premises 13-14 are rooted in a medieval metaphysics of good and evil which I do not understand anywhere near as much about as you do (how would you explain these premises, or do you have any recommended reading for me on this topic?)

Thus, if this argument is sound, it would mean that supervenience is the proximate explanation of moral facts, but not the ultimate explanation.

2) Not all laws require law givers. For example, why think that the moral law requires God when most seem to think that the "laws" of logic need not be grounded in a God?

Response: While it is true that some theists aren't stubborn about grounding the rules of logic in the mind of God, some are. However, there is something different about objective moral values and duties as compared with logic. With respect to logic, we can view them as useful fictions, mere conventions, formalisms, etc. In each case, we sacrifice their objectivity and resort to some sort of pragmatic justification instead. However, if we try to do this with respect to moral values and duties, then we would be denying their objectivity. However, we know that murdering an innocent person isn't merely wrong in the conventional sense, or a useful fiction for describing such an act. Rather, such an act is objectively wrong. So, we can sacrifice the objectivity of logic by taking away the need for a grounding explanation of the laws therein and not 'much' is lost, but we cannot do this to moral values and duties without sacrificing their objectivity. However, we know that objective moral values and duties exists, therefore, they require some sort of grounding explanation. Put another way, when we apprehend the truth value of $2+2=4$, we understand what these symbols mean given certain rules, but we do not immediately apprehend a realm of abstract objects containing numbers and the like. Some people may think such things exist, but they offer separate arguments for it. Moral values and duties on the other hand are apprehended immediately as existing and as objectively true. Thus, since objective moral values and duties need to be grounded, the theist will argue that God provides the best explanation of their existence and objectivity. Lastly, my version of the moral argument is based on the mere existence of objective moral facts, and not the premise that all laws need a lawgiver.

3) Has Evolution Debunked Moral Realism?

Taken From SEP entry:

“4.1 Evolutionary Biology and the Debunking of Morality

As discussed in section 2, evolutionary accounts of the origins of our capacity to be guided by moral judgments do not require any appeal to the comprehension of moral *truths* by our hominin ancestors, or even to the existence of such truths. Such stories require only claims about natural selection pressures having favored the development of such a capacity and tendency because of the positive effects such traits had on biological fitness (Kitcher 2006a, 176; Joyce 2006, 131, 184; Street 2006, 127 f.). Should this fact undermine our confidence in the notions of moral truth and knowledge?

There are, of course, lots of cases where we seem to be able to grasp genuine truths even though those truths play no role in the story of how our basic mental capacities evolved. We are able to grasp truths of quantum field theory or higher dimensional topology, even though those truths had nothing to do with why the basic mental capacities underlying these abilities evolved in Pleistocene hominins. Those capacities evolved in response to selection pressures in ancestral

hunger-gatherer environments, and we have simply learned how to exercise them in developed cultural contexts to discover truths that go far beyond any that were relevant to the evolution of those underlying capacities. Philosophers who endorse some form of moral realism have typically believed that we've done the same thing in grasping moral truths (see sections 2.4-2.5).

Suppose, however, that evolutionary influences have also pervasively shaped the *content* of our moral thought and feeling, through evolved emotional dispositions or “domain specific modules” that provide us with inherited moral instincts that shape our beliefs. Some have argued that because this is so, we will be saddled with radical moral skepticism (the view that we can't know anything about morality) if we accept moral realism (the view that there are independent moral truths); but since radical moral skepticism is implausible, moral realism must therefore be false (Street 2006). The core argument goes roughly like this:

“Our system of evaluative judgments is thoroughly saturated with evolutionary influence,” because of the role natural selection played in shaping our underlying psychological dispositions (Street 2006, 114). But natural selection shaped those dispositions simply according to which variations best contributed to the biological fitness of our hominin ancestors, rather than in ways that would be expected to track independent moral truths, even if they existed. So if there are independent moral truths, as the moral realist claims, then the “tremendous” evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs constitutes nothing but a distorting influence. But that means that we should have no confidence that our moral beliefs accurately represent such moral truths. So given the evolutionary influences on our moral beliefs, moral realism leads to moral skepticism: we can't know any of our moral beliefs to be true. But such radical skepticism is implausible. Therefore, we should reject moral realism (Street 2006).

It is unclear, however, why we should accept the initial claim about “tremendous” evolutionary influence “saturating” our moral beliefs across the board. As discussed in section 2, it seems doubtful that such a strong claim can be supported by science itself. Even if there is significant evolutionary influence on the content of our moral beliefs, it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are arrived at through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning, just as with our mathematical, scientific and philosophical beliefs. Consider, for example, how a moral realist will approach the above argument. It is intended to show that his belief in independent moral truths is false and should be rejected. But that means that this conclusion cannot just be *assumed* from the start. Yet if we begin the argument allowing that there may be independent moral truths, then why should we accept the initial claim about the pervasive influence of evolutionary forces on the content of our moral thinking? If there are independent moral truths, then we would plausibly have grasped many of them through autonomous exercises of our capacities for moral reflection, in which case our moral beliefs cannot just be assumed to be saturated with evolutionary influence (see section 2). Perhaps some are and some aren't, and the proportions will depend on the extent to which we've successfully exercised autonomous reflection in arriving at our moral beliefs, which is an open question. If there are enough autonomous beliefs in the mix, and we can identify them, then the rest of the argument will not go through.^[10]

The debunking argument would be strengthened if we had good reason to be skeptical about autonomous moral reflection. In this vein, Street claims that whatever moral reflection and reasoning we engage in is limited merely to assessing “thoroughly contaminated” evaluative

beliefs using “tools of rational reflection [that are] equally contaminated” (Street 2006: 124). The problem, however, is that this claim is based upon the very premise in question: the tools of reflection are allegedly thoroughly contaminated *because of* the “tremendous” evolutionary influence on the content of “our” moral judgments across the board; yet our question is why we should believe the latter in the first place. Until we are given independent reason to discount the power of moral reflection so radically, treating it as nothing more than using some rotten apples to judge other rotten apples, we seem to have little reason to dismiss the possibility of autonomous moral reflection, and therefore little reason to accept the initial claim of pervasive “saturation” of our moral beliefs with evolutionary influence.

Street actually casts her argument in terms of a “Darwinian dilemma” for realists, which centers around the following question: what is the relation between the evolutionary shaping of moral judgments and the independent moral truths posited by realists? (Street 2006, 109). As already noted, the best scientific accounts suggest that there would be no special relation here, even if such moral truths existed. But if there is no special relation between this evolutionary shaping and independent moral truths, then we would have no reason to trust our moral beliefs, which are as likely to be off-track as on-track, leading to moral skepticism. So the realist seems to face a *dilemma*: reject the best available science or lose all justification for our moral beliefs.

One way out of the dilemma for a realist, along the lines described above, is simply to deny that the evolutionary influence on the content of our moral beliefs is as pervasive as she claims, to grant that where it does exist it is merely a distorting influence, and to provide a more robust account of moral reflection and reasoning that allows us to arrive at reliable moral knowledge despite the presence of *some* distorting influences. Realists will claim that we don't *need* natural selection to have given us moral beliefs that track moral truths, any more than we need this in science or philosophy: all we need is for natural selection to have given us faculties that we can use in ways that reliably track moral truths, and enough freedom from evolutionarily given instincts that we can so exercise those faculties.^[11]

Finally, Street challenges the realist to specify what faculty or capacity might ground our capacity to arrive at independent moral truths, how the former evolved, and how the latter could plausibly have arisen as a byproduct of it. She claims that there is no plausible story to be told here, since the capacity to grasp independent moral truths would have to be “a highly specialized, sophisticated capacity” akin to the human eye, and no such entity could plausibly emerge “as the purely incidental byproduct of some unrelated capacity that was selected for on other grounds entirely” (Street 2006, 142-43). But the realist's story needn't take that form. The claim will be just that our capacity to grasp moral truths—like our capacity to grasp philosophical truths about metaphysical necessity, say—is simply a byproduct of our general capacities for critical reasoning, combined with the evolved capacity for forming and employing normative concepts in our thinking and decision-making.

A related but somewhat different debunking argument focuses on the origins of moral *concepts* (Joyce 2006, chap. 6). It begins with the claim that we have a *complete non-moral* genealogy of our moral beliefs—a complete explanation of how we've come to believe what we do, which does not require any appeal to moral *truths*. Instead, we explain the origins of our moral concepts—such as fairness, justice, and guilt—in evolutionary terms, recalling that natural

selection would have rewarded genetic propagation, not the tracking of moral truths, in shaping them; and then we explain our beliefs employing those moral concepts in familiar sociological and psychological terms. The claim is then that the existence of such a non-moral genealogy of moral beliefs makes the notion of moral truths “explanatorily superfluous”—just as truths about witches are explanatorily superfluous given a complete genealogy of beliefs about witches that does not involve any appeal to truths about witches. And if moral truths are explanatorily superfluous, then we should not posit them, any more than we posit truths about witches: we should remain agnostic about moral truth and give up any claims to moral knowledge. In other words, evolutionary biology leads to moral skepticism.

The critical questions about this argument parallel those raised about the previous one. Even if it is granted that crude versions of our *concepts* of fairness or guilt originated through evolutionary processes in our hominin ancestors, independently of any connection to moral truths, it remains possible that through cultural evolution we have developed refined *conceptions* of fairness or guilt that can be employed in epistemically respectable ways. Regardless of how and why the concept of fairness originated, why should we doubt that we can today use a refined conception of fairness to state moral truths, such as the truth that race-based voting laws are unfair and wrong? If there are grounds of skepticism about this they would have to lie in reasons to doubt the soundness of our first-order moral arguments about fairness, rather than in claims about how and why a crude version of the concept first arose (Nagel 1997).

Absent such doubts, it's not clear why the mere fact of historical evolutionary influence should undermine our confidence in our moral claims. To draw an analogy, should a theist give up her belief just because crude, ancestral forms of religious belief can be causally explained without appeal to theological facts? Perhaps she will if she finds no good reasons for her own belief, and concludes that it is to be explained along similar lines. But if she has reflected on the matter and been persuaded by a “cosmological argument from fine tuning,” for example, then it seems she might reasonably maintain her belief, taking her employment of the concept of a deity to be epistemically legitimate despite the fact that other employments are subject to debunking evolutionary, sociological and psychological explanations.

In general, the worry about Joyce's debunking argument is similar to the worry about Street's: unless we start out *already* assuming (against the realist) that there are no knowable moral truths, it is hard to see why we should accept Joyce's premise that we possess a *complete non-moral* genealogy of moral judgment, and hence that it is explanatorily superfluous to posit moral truths. Whether or not the non-moral genealogy is complete is precisely what is in question in ongoing metaethical debates: realists, who posit knowable moral truths, claim that the correct explanation for at least many of our moral beliefs does appeal to moral truths or facts that we have grasped, while anti-realists, who deny the existence of such truths, claim that the correct explanation for all of our moral beliefs involves no such appeal. The issue remains controversial. So unless one has independently settled that issue against realism, one is unlikely to accept the premise that there is a complete non-moral genealogy of our moral beliefs: there may well be a *partial* non-moral genealogy, for the sorts of reasons Joyce gives, but it will be *complete* only if *none* of our moral beliefs are the result of our having grasped moral truths; and this negative claim will be very unlikely if there are in fact knowable moral truths (since we would plausibly have grasped some of them, and they would thus figure into the explanation of some of our

moral beliefs). We should therefore feel compelled to grant Joyce's premise that there *is* such a complete non-moral genealogy only if we have *already given up* on the idea of knowable moral truths. But that makes it hard to see how the argument as a whole can be used to persuade anyone who doesn't already accept its conclusion.

Finally, it is worth considering a provocative, fanciful reflection from Darwin himself (later echoed closely by E.O. Wilson 1978, 204-206), which might at least suggest a related skeptical argument:

It may be well first to premise that I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. In the same manner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering. Nevertheless the bee, or any other social animal, would in our supposed case gain, as it appears to me, some feeling of right and wrong, or a conscience (Darwin 1871, 73).

The argument at least suggested by this passage is that our moral sense, which generates our moral beliefs, has the shape and content it has because of the contingencies of human ecology; had creatures with a very different ecology, such as bees, come to be rational, they would thus have developed a very different moral sense suitable to their ecology. But then which of these very different moral senses could be expected reliably to track moral truths (if they exist)? The answer seems to be: *neither* (unless we simply relativize moral truths to various possible ecologies, taking such truths to reduce to facts about effective genetic propagation—though as we saw in section 3, such a move has little moral plausibility). For moral senses are contingent products of particular ecologies in a way that cannot be expected to track independent and stable moral truths. We and the hypothetical rational bees will thus have very different moral outlooks, each of which is explicable in terms of our respective ecologies and will seem quite natural to those who occupy the relevant ecology (while the other's outlook will seem bizarre), but neither of which seems to have any claim to be a reliable guide to *moral truth* (as usually conceived). This imaginary exercise in perspective thus seems to support moral skepticism: the very idea of independent, stable moral truths will seem suspect (playing no role in the explanation of the origins of various possible moral senses), and our confidence that our moral sense would track them in any case will seem unwarranted.

What such an argument overlooks, however, is precisely the factor of *autonomous moral reflection* that the bees' imagined rationality would bring with it (see sections 2.4-2.5, and McDowell 1995). True, we might expect relatively unreflective and tradition-bound bees to speak of “sacred duties” to kill brothers or fertile daughters, in a way that lines up with the relevant genetic relations that figured into the evolution of their given moral senses. But we could equally expect more reflective bees (the buzzing philosophers among them) to raise the question whether they really had *good reason* to do everything that their evolution has disposed them to do in the service of maximizing their genetic propagation. These more philosophical

bees might consider the possibility that some potential goods of bee life, in the context of ongoing innovations in rational bee culture, might be available to them if they resisted certain impulses and acted differently; and this might lead to the development of at least partly autonomous moral norms, and hence moral senses that are a complex mixture of inherited dispositions and rational judgment.

If bees became rational, then, there is no reason to suppose that their moral sensibilities would simply reflect their ecology any more than human moral sensibilities simply reflect human ecology: to the extent that they are really rational, we should expect some autonomous reflection, and perhaps even significant overlap with autonomous human moral reflection, as we both strive for something beyond the merely biologically useful (FitzPatrick 2000, 355-56). This is not to suggest, of course, that moral truths or objective moral norms, if they exist, will be exactly the same for human life and for rational bee life, or for actual human life and human life imagined under vastly different ecological circumstances. On any plausible view of morality, there will be significant variation in moral principles and/or their applications where there is significant variation in the basic facts of life. Just as we could never live just like bees, bees could never live just like humans, and no reasonable morality would demand such a thing. Even a realist, then, will grant a significant degree of cross-species moral relativism (or counterfactual moral relativism for deeply different courses of human evolution). But it needn't be the extreme and implausible relativism linking true moral standards simply and directly to ecology, and whatever moral truths might obtain for each species might well be accessible to members of each species through autonomous moral reflection, with at least some points of convergence.

4) Evolution has shown us that our moral beliefs are false. 5) Evolution has shown us that our moral beliefs are unwarranted.

Response to 4) and 5): **First, let's get clear on one version of the moral argument and see which premise(s) is allegedly under attack by the theory of evolution (this will be the version of the argument that we will use for the rest of our discussion):**

1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.

2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.

3) Therefore, (MT 1,2), God exists.

The kind of naturalistic attack on the moral argument you mentioned seeks to defeat the truth of premise 2 in some way. Actually, there are two kinds of "defeaters," undercutting, and rebutting. An **undercutting defeater** shows that some claim (i.e. premise 2), may be true, but some other independent consideration steals away our confidence and evidence that used to make us think the same claim was true. For example, we may have some reason(s) to think that objective moral values and duties exist, but something about evolution **undercuts** our evidence for, and confidence in, the truth of premise 2 above (i.e. Objective moral values and duties exist).

However, undercutting defeaters do not show some claim (i.e. premise 2) to be false. Undercutting defeaters merely show some claim (i.e. premise 2) to be unjustified. On the other hand, a **rebutting defeater** is some independent claim, the truth of which would show some other claim to be plainly false. For example, if a person could show us somehow that premise two was plainly false (rather than merely undercutting premise two), then we shouldn't believe that objective moral values and duties exist. In the case of a rebutting defeater, it is not just that objective moral values and duties may exist and we just don't know it (as in the case of an undercutting defeater), it is that they really don't exist at all. What I want to claim at the outset, is that a certain feature of evolution may be used to **undercut**, but not **rebut** the claim that objective moral values and duties exist.

How evolution may be used to undercut our belief in the truth of premise two from the moral argument:

As Alvin Plantinga (and others) have pointed out, Christianity isn't inconsistent with *Darwinian evolution* per se; for God may have used evolution in creating some things, or all things, or none at all. The point of this discussion is not to try and discover whether or not God used evolution or not, but rather to assume that evolution is true and see what that means for the viability of the moral argument. Please just assume for now with me that evolution is true and God used it to create life on Earth. How can evolution constitute an undercutting defeater for premise two of the moral argument? Put bluntly, the sense of morality evolved by the human race would only be undercut, if *Darwinian Evolution* were true, and *there was no intelligent supervisor that directed (either directly or indirectly) the process of the evolution in the development of our cognitive faculties.* Let me explain in the next section.

Two possible hidden premises in how evolution can undercut our belief in objective morality:

Premise 1: If any feature of the human species' cognitive equipment has evolved, then there is no objective referent in reality for the beliefs produced by such cognitive equipment.

Objection: This premise is the one that even prominent Christian apologists like William Lane Craig seem to attack, and it is very easy to show that this premise is false. Think about it, if all our beliefs and knowledge are unjustified (or even false) just because they evolved, then all the brain "power" that goes into defending, developing, and articulating the theory of evolution would then be unreliable. In other words, all of our beliefs, not simply our belief in an objective morality, would be undercut; including anyone's belief in the theory of evolution itself! However, I think there is a more subtle, and harder to defeat premise that a person could defend using evolution to undercut premise two of the moral argument.

Premise 2: Natural selection would overtime choose those human beings that have cognitive faculties that track reality reliably because truth-tracking cognitive faculties would help a biological organism survive and reproduce much better than an organism with false beliefs about reality. However, natural selection would be blind to non-physical things that may or may not exist; such as objective moral values and duties; and is only capable of forming reliable cognitive faculties around perceptual beliefs (i.e. knowledge of senses).

In other words, if our brains were the product of evolution, then what has evolved was selected for its survival value, and not necessarily it's truth-tracking ability. However, in the case of our senses, the more reliable the better, and so probably, our senses are truth tracking. Our moral sense on the other hand could be false, but just as conducive to survival and reproduction; but this is not the case with respect to our perceptual beliefs, such as: tigers as dangerous (arguably, beliefs of this sort need to be true in order for us to survive). There seems to be then, a tight connection between true beliefs and survival in the case of perceptual knowledge, but a much looser connection between true moral beliefs and survival. While it is in principle possible that our sense of morality is reliable, in the sense of being truth-tracking, it is highly improbable on the premise of unguided evolution because natural selection is blind to non-physical objects (if objective moral values and duties exist, they are probably non-physical). What this means is that the probability that our moral sense of right and wrong is truth-tracking, and not merely beneficial for survival and reproduction is either less than .5, or such a probability is inscrutable. In either case, unguided evolution would constitute an undercutting defeater for our belief that it is true that objective moral values and duties exist.

Possible responses to uphold premise two of the moral argument:

Undercutting defeaters-

1) It may be that there are beliefs that are required for belief in unguided evolution that natural selection would be blind to as well. In such a case, it would become self-defeating for a person to try to undercut premise two by appealing to evolution. One such candidate that the Christian can bring up is the metaphysical principle of causality. Without this metaphysical principle, which we can't get outside our senses to verify as objective (just read about David Hume's problem of induction), the theory of evolution would be unintelligible. However, the belief in the metaphysical principle of causality is something that natural selection would be blind to, and so if the proponent of **unguided evolution** is to hold his position, he must allow other metaphysical beliefs that natural selection would be blind to, to count as justified; such as the belief in objective moral values and duties!

2)Let's look at the argument again, taking out the word objective moral values and duties, and replacing it with any of the following: human minds, rocks, rainbows, the past, that science can

discover the truth, etc. Surely the conclusion of the argument in each case seems wrong. Human minds naturally form beliefs in those things and in doing so, we think, they get things right. So why not conclude that they get things right when it comes to belief in objective moral values and duties? What makes this case different? One could say: “Well, because moral beliefs are false.” But that is not much of an argument—it just begs the question.

3) Another undercutting defeater could come from some other argument that you think leads to the conclusion that God exists such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Remember, that it is only on naturalism and evolution that Darwinism presents trouble for premise two of the moral argument. While the Kalam Argument doesn't get you to a good God who guided evolution and so is interested in our cognitive faculties forming reliable beliefs about reality, it constitutes enough evidence to steal away the confidence of a person that thinks evolution is unguided, for if God exists, then it becomes much more probable that our cognitive faculties are reliable because God plausibly would have guided evolution.

4) There might be a perfectly good natural explanation of the objective morals and values-faculty and the beliefs it produces (along the lines of evolution, HADD, and ToM) but it might also be true that a personal God providentially guided these natural processes so that people would acquire true belief in objective moral values and duties. Both the natural and the supernatural explanations may be true.

5) This objection assumes that beliefs that are by-products of evolution are unwarranted. However, beliefs that are by-products of our cognitive faculties may be true and are often widely and rationally accepted as such. Indeed, science is the by-product of domains that were not the intended objects of the cognitive faculties that operate in those domains. Nonetheless, in order to accept evolution as true and rational we have to rely on beliefs that are by-products of domains that evolution didn't intrinsically intend to be truth-tracking for scientific discoveries!

Possible Rebutting Defeaters: We just need to show in some way that our cognitive faculties were intended in some way, the product of purpose, or guidance:

1) *The argument in the book Privileged Planet* is that the conditions that are most conducive to the habitability on a planet, are also those conditions that are the most conducive to making discoveries about the universe. The conclusion then is that the high improbability of these conditions being met on any planet (and Earth is one of those planets) conjoined with the independent pattern of making discoveries about the universe, is evidence of intelligent design; and secondarily, that our cognitive faculties were designed (guided) to be what they are.

2) A similar argument is contained within something Einstein once said: “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” The idea is that the high

improbability of beings such as ourselves existing and having intelligence sufficient to gain knowledge of the universe (like the theory of evolution itself), conjoined with the independent pattern of the intelligibility and rational structure of the universe; is best explained by intelligent design; and secondarily, that our cognitive faculties are designed.

3) The historical evidence used in constructing the case for inference to the best explanation that God raised Jesus from the dead; and the interpretation of this miracle as divine vindication for Jesus' radical divine self-understanding specifically lends credibility to the reliability of our moral sense of right and wrong. For, if objective moral values and duties do not exist, then the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus was irrational. If morality isn't objective then we haven't sinned, and we are not in need of a savior.

4) The witness of the Holy Spirit to point three above provides non-inferential evidence that objective moral values and duties exist. This is just another way to know that Jesus was who he claimed to be, and God proved it to us by raising Jesus from the dead. It is just that it can be known evidentially as in point 3, or non-evidentially, as in the case of the Witness of the Holy Spirit.